Inner cabinets and outer ministers: some lessons from Australia and Britain

Abstract. The growth in the number of ministers has led to problems in the organization of cabinet. In Britain, and in Australia under Liberal-Country Party government, a system of inner cabinets and outer ministers has been adopted. In Australia all ministers have their own departments - as dictated by the Constitution;those who are not full members of cabinet are able to attend cabinet and participate, not only when items of their own or related portfolios are discussed, but also on a range of other issues in which they have a personal interest. In Britain all departments are headed by a cabinet minister. Each cabinet member is assisted by a range of junior ministers whose access to cabinet is limited and whose broad knowledge of government activity is therefore severely limited. In making cabinet there is thus a choice between a small cabinet, representing only parts of government interests but with flexible access, and a large representative cabinet with limited access for junior ministers. Sommaire. .?augmentation du nombre des ministres présente des difficultés pour ?organisation du cabinet. La Grande-Bretagne et ?Australie, sous un gouvernement libéral-rural, ont adopté un système de cabinets restreints et de ministres ← externes →. En Australie, tous les ministres ont, de la par la Constitution, leur propre ministère; ceux qui ne sont pas membres à part entiére du cabinet peuvent assister à ses déliberations et y participer, et cela aussi bien lorsque les débats portent sur des questions relevant de leur portefeuille que lorsqu'elles présentent pour eux un intérêt particulier. En Grande-Bretagne, tous les ministères sont dirigés par un ministre du cabinet. Chaque ministre du cabinet est aidé par un groupe de ministres de deuxième rang dont ?accès au cabinet est limité et dont, par conséquent, la connaissance générate des activités gouvernementales est aussi sévèrement réduite. Pour composer le cabinet, il y a done un choix entre un cabinet restreint ne représentant que partiellement les intérêts du gouvernement mais dont ?accès est ajustable et un large cabinet représentatif avec accés limité pour les ministres de deuxième rang.     

Lethal intoxication with arsenic using prepared butter

The present case report deals with a lethal intoxication with arsenic mixed into butter. It describes the course of events over about two days on the basis of the statements by the persons involved, the clinical findings after the belated hospitalisation of the victim, the results of the first pathological autopsy, the forensic autopsy performed after exhumation and the results of the chemical-toxicological investigations. The results are discussed in relation to the later confession of the female perpetrator and her statements regarding a previous unsuccessful murder attempt by poisoning. It also presents the judgement pronounced by the court and the reasons given for it.     

Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy

Studies of US trade policy legislation focus on the effect of constituents on trade policy voting and give less weight to institutions such as political parties. To demonstrate that political parties affect voting, I compare the votes of politicians who share constituency characteristics but differ in political party affiliation. This approach requires less reliance on assumptions about, or empirical measures of, constituents’ trade preferences. The results demonstrate that political parties play a significant role in legislative voting on trade policy. Theories of political economy therefore should incorporate how constituency interests and partisan pressures affect legislative voting.     

FOSTERING CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE COURTS

This article focuses on how mediation services can be improved to better reflect the culture-based needs and expectations of Latino litigants. The research on which this article is based was conducted in a court-attached custody and visitation program in one U. S. community with a large Latino presence. The findings, recommendations, and conclusions are based on the problems, concerns, and general expectations of more recent arrivals to the United States – for the most part mono-lingual Spanish speaking. The study found that those Latino families have needs in resolving family disputes that differ from those of most Anglo families. The justice system needs to better understand the culture of Latino family life and the ways in which Latinos interact with governmental authority. The Latino families need education, direction and representation in dealing with governmental authority. The mediator can help both the justice system and the Latino family in meeting these needs.     

A Capacity for Central Coordination: The Case of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

For the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) the year 1987 can now be seen as pivotal in marking a clear end to a period of transition in coordinating structures in the Australian Public Service (APS) that had lasted roughly 20 years. The abolition in 1987 of the Public Service Board, formerly a powerful coordinating agency, is the most obvious marker of the change. The PSB's departure left the Secretary of PM&C with a role that is now often described as ‘head of the public service’. More broadly, the 1987 changes to the machinery of government both formalised and enabled a sea‐change in PM&C's role. Before 1987 a large policy initiation and development project would usually have been considered as beyond PM&C's scope. Since then, extensive and direct policy development work by PM&C has become common. The continuing debates have been over whether PM&C actually delivers in these roles (an empirical question) and how far it should play them (a normative issue). In this article we itemise the capacity, both continuing and developing, which PM&C has to support policy development. Traditional coordination mechanisms are an important part of this armoury and PM&C has long experience of most of them. However policy initiation and development calls for other tools which PM&C has had to develop over the past few decades. There is scope for conflict between the coordination and initiation/development roles. Understanding how a central agency like PM&C carries out each of them and balances the two can potentially contribute to debates on organisational design. We also address the normative issue: whether the growth of prime ministerial impact is a result of an increase in public service support or a cause of its increase ( Walter and Strangio 2007 ) and whether it should be restrained. We accept that the new developments give prime ministers the capacity to oversee policy arenas where once they could not, but regard this as a consequence as much of demand from above as of ambition within the department.     

Prisons, the Private Sector and the Market: Some Queensland Lessons

Queensland has two prisons run by private companies; the first contract was signed in 1989. In 1995 a competitive tender for a new prison was won by the QCSC against two private providers. Further, there is now a belief that prisons should be run on commercial grounds. The principal agency, the Queensland Corrective Services Commission (QCSC) has been divided into two bodies — a purchaser and a provider — to allow markets to prevail in Queensland corrective services. What can be learnt from these developments? This article will, first, provide a brief history of the changes; second, it will explore whether the initial objectives for the introduction of the private sector into the corrective system have been met; and third it will ask whether market forces can or should be a dominant feature and hence whether a corrective services system can or should be organised on a commercial basis.