A Moveable Place With A Moveable Past: Perspectives on Central Europe

This paper discusses whether the region which in the 1990s has been called the Visegrád Four is a political and/or cultural whole and if so, in what respects. Using the concepts centre and periphery the paper argues that parts of contemporary Central Europe were political and cultural centres of the European civilisation in previous eras. The interpretation and use of this past in the Central European states' contemporary endeavour to join NATO and the EU is discussed. That historical chronology is superseded by what may be labelled the mythological presence of things past is especially noted.     

Advisory bodies and morality policies: does ethical expertise matter?

Policy Sciences - Governments and parliaments struggle to design biomedical policies: while research and practice make rapid progress, they often trigger value conflicts. One response involves...     

The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear – or Reproducing It?

Abstract

Drawing on the constructivist concept of ‘securitisation’, this article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and responses to, Norway's Svalbard policy in the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses on three policy issues which have figured prominently on Russia's arctic security agenda in recent years: (1) the establishment and use of civilian radars and satellite ground stations on the archipelago, (2) the adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act, and (3) the Norwegian Coast Guard's fishery enforcement measures in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The article concludes that despite the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Arctic region after the Cold War, Svalbard has not ceased to be a security concern for Russia.     

Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies

Recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies. This need not be the case. Alliances serve as commitment devices, adding ex ante credibility to states' claims about ex post behavior. Variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments. Put simply, democracies are "most improved" by formal commitments. We offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners. Information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic. Determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically. We test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention, rather than on the duration or the number of commitments. Our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies.