The politics of Belgium: Institutions and policy under bipolar and centrifugal federalism

This volume seeks to provide an integrated understanding of the Belgian political system through the prism of comparative politics. The transformation of the political system from a unitary into a federal system is used as a connecting theme linking the contributions. The volume is divided in two parts. The first part touches upon the sociological and institutional determinants of policy-making in Belgium, such as the dynamics of the Belgian federal system, the consociational features of the Belgian polity, the presence of a Belgian political culture (or of two distinct political cultures), the fragmentation of its party system and the role of political parties. The second part addresses policy performance and policy reform within the context of Belgian federalism, with a focus on divergence in policy performance and administrative practices, social security as a contentious federal policy area, policy failure and corruption and the impact of EU policies on the domestic federal order.     

‘Will it stay or will it go?’ Federalism and the sustainability of Belgium

This article provides an overview of the federalisation of Belgium. It first discusses why Belgium acquired a federal character when the politics of the centre already recognised the multilingual character of the Belgian state. Subsequently the authors discuss the specificities of the Belgian federal system when it is placed in a comparative perspective. The presence of two different types of regions – Regions and Communities – the steering capacity of a small group of political elites reluctant to give up political control, the presence of institutional asymmetries, the initially dual nature of dividing competencies and the slow development of intergovernmental relations are highlighted as specific features of Belgian federalism. In the final section, the authors assess the assets and liabilities of federalism from the viewpoint of institutional stability. They argue that while Belgian federalism contains significant institutional shock absorbers and issues of common interest, the further unravelling of the centre in a confederal direction is more likely.     

Insincere voting under the successive procedure

Most European parliaments use the successive procedure to reach decisions. This means that a parliament votes feasible alternatives one-by-one in a pre-determined order until one of them obtains a majority of votes. The paper has two objectives. First, I sketch a simple method making it easy to uncover instances of successful insincere voting under the successive procedure. Second, by focusing on data from one national assembly consistently using this procedure, I demonstrate that insincere or strategic voting is very rare. The finding does not indicate that politicians necessarily behave in a non-strategic or unsophisticated manner. It means only that strategic maneuvers may take place at earlier stages of the decision-making process, for example, in designing the voting agenda.