Child Care Subsidies and Employment Behavior Among Very‐Low‐Income Populations in Three States

Using merged administrative data from welfare reform evaluations in three states, we estimate the effects of child care subsidy use on the length of time it takes for a welfare applicant to move into substantial employment. Findings show that the use of a child care subsidy during an unemployed or marginally employed spell of welfare receipt is associated with between a 0.6 and 1.7 quarter (or 11% to 34%) reduction in the time to substantial employment in two of the three state samples. The positive influence of subsidy use on transitions to substantial employment is strongest for those welfare applicants with the lowest earnings who are mixing welfare and work prior to subsidy receipt.     

Resolving university landlord-tenant disputes

Conclusion The housing arbitration system used by Brigham Young University's Housing Arbitration Board (HAB) has been widely used at the school for many years. It has not worked perfectly. Some landlords are critical of the school's laxness in enforcing arbitral awards.In general, students prefer the process over small claims court (chiefly, it appears, because of cost factors). The school administrators prefer mediation over arbitration but recognize that mediation does not always resolve impasses. Legal questions exist about BYU's potential restraint of trade in using the obligatory contracts the school mandates for landlords. The process relies upon persons of goodwill to serve on the tribunals, but has a long enough track record to demonstrate the HAB concept works quite well. Because of annual turnover, the need for training of mediators/arbitrators is always critical. Other universities may well wish to emulate (or modify) the HAB model in resolving their landlord and student-tenant disputes. William M. Timmins is Professor of Personnel Administration and Labor-Management Relations at the Graduate School of Management, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602. Among his recent publications isThe International Economic Policy Coordination Instrument: The OECD Experience (London: The University Press, 1985).     

The Medicare secondary payor provisions: possible rewards and pitfalls

A 1990 report prepared by the Office of Inspector General estimated that as much as $1 billion is lost to the Medicare program annually because (i) secondary payor situations are not detected and (ii) insurance companies often do not pay when they are required to be the primary payors. Office of Inspector General, No. A-09-98-00151, April 1990, Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) [symbol: see text] 39,112, at 25,649. In order to better enforce the MSP provisions, suggestions have been made at the Congressional level to impose sanctions against providers who demonstrate a pattern of inappropriate billing practices such as double billing, repeated failures to screen beneficiaries for other insurance coverage, and the repeated submission to Medicare of bills that should be submitted to another payor. (See the Subcommittee Report on erroneous payments under the MSP program, supra.) Although authority for such sanctions has yet to be adopted, given the fiscal problems currently plaguing the federal government, providers can expect increased enforcement of the MSP provisions as a means of reducing Medicare costs, and should review their screening and billing practices accordingly.