An economic theory of intentional torts

The topic of intentional torts is, at first glance, an unpromising one for economics. ‘Intent’ is not a normal part of the economist's vocabulary and does not appear to correspond to any concept in economics. Perhaps this is why there is so little economic writing on intentional torts as such.¹ We shall argue, however, that the concept of intentional tort can be given a coherent economic meaning and we shall try to show that the common law treatment of intentional torts can be explained on the hypothesis that the common law attempts to promote efficiency.     

DEADLY FORCE AS A POLICY PROBLEM IN LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: DO ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

This article examines the impact of six administrative practices on the use of deadly force by police officers in American cities with a population greater than 50,000. Generally, departmental policies demonstrate little association with the frequency of shooting incidents per police officer, or in the number of incidents resulting in fatalities or injuries. It does appear that police departments which issue more traditional sidearms tend to experience fewer incidents than departments which issue heavier firearms. This same lack of association between administrative practices and the use of deadly force is discovered when controlling for city population size arid state legal codes. Notwithstanding that some of the relationships are in the expected direction, their lack of statistical significance suggests that the use of deadly force has its antecedents in sources other than the administrative policies of local police departments.     

Uncertainty and political participation

The minimax regret model of decision making under uncertainty, which was proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) as a model of the voting decision, is here generalized to encompass forms of political participation (such as contributing money or time to a campaign) in which the range of alternatives is continuous. A principal implication of the model is that aggregate campaign contributions may be substantially increased by limiting the amount that any one individual can contribute. The conditions under which the behavior of a minimax regret decision maker can be unambiguously distinguished from that of an expected utility maximizer are also specified.     

Training prison inmates as paralegals: An experimental project

A program to train inmates as paralegals was established at a large state prison in the Midwest. Qualified inmates were randomly assigned to the training or to a control condition. Both groups were administered measures assessing legal knowledge, the use of legal knowledge, attitudes about the criminal justice system, and self-perceptions before and after training. The trainee group showed a significant increase in its amount of legal knowledge after training. Members of the trainee group also reported a significant increase in the number of other inmates requesting aid from them on legal problems. In addition, interviews were conducted with two random samples of the general inmate population, before and after the paralegal training program. These interviews revealed strong support for the training program, and this support increased over the period of the program. Limited data on longer-term effectiveness of the paralegal's performance in the prison legal aid clinic and in paralegal jobs following parole supported the positive, shorter-term results.