The Lost Sexenio: Vicente Fox and the New Politics of Economic Reform in Mexico

The 2000 presidential election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox signaled an end to seven decades of Mexico's single-party regime and seemed to herald the advent of truly competitive politics. But by 2003, economic reform had largely stalled, and Fox's party suffered a historically unprecedented midterm' loss in the congress. This article analyzes the underpinnings of policy gridlock in the Fox administration. Fox inherited the need for microeconomic restructuring and increased competitiveness, more innovative and pragmatic state policies, the need to pay attention to the country's sharp income inequalities, and the challenge of crafting a political strategy that could build a middle ground and foster policy consensus. With his party's minority standing in the congress, Fox was constrained from the start by divided government. But more effective statecraft and coalition building would have helped. These will be essential elements for the success of any post-Fox regime.     

Economic Threats or Societal Turmoil? Understanding Preferences for Authoritarian Political Systems

Why do some individuals prefer to be governed in an authoritarian political system? One intuitive answer is that citizens prefer authoritarian rule when the economy and society are in turmoil. These are common explanations for democratic backsliding, and the emergence and success of authoritarian leaders in the twentieth century. Which of these explanations better explains preferences for authoritarian rule? Both types of threat coincide in small samples and high-profile cases, creating inferential problems. I address this by using three waves of World Values Survey data to look at individual-level preferences for different forms of authoritarian government. Using multiple macroeconomic and societal indicators, I find that economic threats, especially increasing income inequality, better explain preferences for authoritarian government. I conclude with implications for understanding the emergence of support for authoritarianism in fledgling democracies.     

The reorientation of place legislation in England in the 1690s

Summary

Mediating Conflict in the Swiss Diets of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

The Helvetic Confederation developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a web of alliances between the most important urban and peasant republics (Orte) in the area of present‐day Switzerland. The only form of mediating conflicts laid down in the alliances was by tribunals of arbitration; but these were never recognised by all the Orte in the web of alliances and proved inadequate in the face of growing antagonisms and coalitions throughout the Confederacy. It became necessary to have recourse to political arrangements involving the interested parties. The forum for these arrangements was the Diets, meetings of deputies of all members of the Confederacy. These more or less represented the most important political forces. Difficulties arose only when there was no consensus in individual Orten and when the official deputies to the Diet represented only the magistrates (Obrigkeiten). In such cases it could happen, especially in matters of foreign policy, that individual groups went their own way and thwarted the decisions of the Diet. It usually took a long time to arrive at a consensus in the Diets because the deputies were bound by an ‘imperative mandate’ and the minority would mostly not accept the will of the majority. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries participation and the achievement of consensus were the conditions of joint action of the Helvetic Confederation.