Social policy, freedom and individuality

Contemporary social policy lacks an account of the ends it serves. The reason for this is a laissez-faire policy regime where property right overwhelms the right of each individual to be a self-determining person. Laissez-faire policy creates a scarcity of public resources where a universalistic social policy cannot be afforded. A narrowly targeted social policy designed for the poor prevails: it is one where the poor are subject to state coercion. In the more expansive social policy associated with social democracy, the outcome of equality is championed but there is no coherent account of how this end can be reconciled with achieving freedom. The universal idea of the self-determining person is the basis of a rationale for social policy. Thus the end that social policy should serve is the development and sustaining of an individual who has the set of capabilities that he or she requires to be free in the sense of self-determining.     

Right,the state and the conception of the person

The contemporary world‐historical epoch involves both the universal extension of the state type of organization of society, and the development of a universal idea of the person in the discourse of human rights. The status of the person requires positive constitution, and such constitution requires an idea of the state that informs the actual working of states. The idea of the state cannot be developed unless the natural right conception of the basis of personhood is abandoned. Nor can the idea of the state be developed if it continues to be confused with the idea of the nation. Hegel offers us an idea of the state that we can continue to build. For Hegel the state denotes both the institutional reality of the state and the subjectivity that is required if the idea of the state is to be actualized. There is a dialectical relationship between the adequacy of the state‐centered institutional order for the effective support and facilitation of personhood and our subjective capacity to be and act as persons. Thus, processes by which the idea of the state is undermined are not independent of subjective experience and our willingness to be and act as persons.     

Feminism and the Technological Age

Abstract

Feminism advocates for the inclusion of women within the modern economy, but this has implicated feminism in a hyper-capitalist and instrumental mode of organising social life. Feminism has helped to legitimise the ubiquitous reach of this regime into all areas of social life, even parenting. Feminism can learn from Heidegger's proposition that in questioning modern technology we may open up a way of coming into a free relationship with it—to be open to the divinity of living beings and things. Jessica Benjamin's account of the relationship between the mother and her infant in terms of intersubjectivity seems to fit Heidegger's proposition for it highlights a dynamic and receptive exchange between two unique living beings. The question for feminism at this time is: how can it own its complicity with modern technology while opening up its distinctive contribution to finding a way of coming into a free relationship with it?