Introduction

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

A Renaissance Man in Memory: Appayya Dīkṣita Through the Ages

This essay is a first attempt to trace the evolution of biographical accounts of Appayya Dīk?ita from the sixteenth century onward, with special attention to their continuities and changes. It explores what these rich materials teach us about Appayya Dīk?ita and his times, and what lessons they offer about the changing historical sensibilities in South India during the transition to the colonial and postcolonial eras. I tentatively identify two important junctures in the development of these materials: one that took place in the first generation to be born after his death, when the idea of him as an avatar of ?iva was introduced, and another at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, when many new stories about his encounters with his colleagues and students surfaced. The essay follows a set of themes and tensions that pertain to Appayya Dīk?ita’s social and political affiliations, his sectarian agendas, and the geographic sphere of his activities. These themes and tensions are closely related and prove to be surprisingly resilient, despite the many changes that occurred during the five centuries of recollection that this essay sketches. This overall coherence, I argue, is integral to Appayya Dīk?ita’s sociopolitical context and self-chosen identity.     

The spy who never was: An intelligence myth in Palestine, 1914–18

Myths, like old soldiers, refuse to die, let alone myths about spies. The adventures of the daring German super‐spy, Fritz Frank (1873–1968), who operated behind British lines in Sinai and Palestine during World War I, disguised as a British officer, have fired the imagination of contemporaries as well as historians and scholars to date. This article shows that while Frank himself was a real, flesh and blood figure, the deeds attributed to him were almost entirely imaginary.     

Overcoming strategic weakness: The Egyptian deception and the Yom Kippur War 1

Analysis of the Egyptian deception on the eve of the October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War serves to illuminate operational rationale, which may guide future strategic deception models and processes. The Egyptians used deception to neutralize two Israeli ‘strong points’ that might jeopardize the crossing of the Suez Canal: the capacity for a preemptive strike and deployment in strength in the Canal region. The deception aimed to minimize Israel's ‘early warning space’, delaying the moment of decision-making and slowing down the IDF's operational response. Implementing a dual technique of concealing and misleading, the deception lulled the Israeli early warning system, the linchpin of its security doctrine, into accepting the (wrong) alternative option. The deception gained the upper hand because it corresponded – even if unintentionally – with the fundamental perception maintained by the victim, contributing to winning the first round of the surprise attack.