Constitutional Agreements without Constitutional Theories

How is constitution‐making possible, when people disagree on so many questions about what is good and what is right? The answer lies in the existence of incompletely theorized agreements–agreements on abstract formulations (freedom of speech, equality under the law) and on particular practices, amidst disagreement about the largest issues in social life. Such agreements help make constitutions and constitutional law possible, even within nations whose citizens cannot concur on the most fundamental matters. Incompletely theorized agreements thus help illuminate an enduring constitutional puzzle: how members of diverse societies can work together on terms of mutual respect amidst intense disagreements about both the right and the good.     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.     

The coalition of the willing: Effect of country diversity in an environmental treaty game

It is analyzed how size differences among countries affect the benefits from climate coalitions. It is shown that size differences lead to smaller coalitions and greater benefits than coalitions among identical countries. The importance of trigger strategies for supporting cooperative solutions is considered. A real world example, based on the world’s six largest emitters, is used to illustrate the implications of size differences in terms of emissions versus valuations of benefits. Climate coalitions become smaller when ranking in terms of benefits is different from ranking in terms of emissions. Three cases of benefit valuations are considered: benefits equal (i) share in world emissions, (ii) share in world GDP, and (iii) share of world population.