How Will We Fight?

In considering the question “How will we fight?”, this article begins by examining the threats we face from conventional, insurgent, and hybrid enemies as well as terrorists and super-empowered individuals. It then outlines how America can fight effectively against each threat—as well as identifying the deficiencies in our current force structure that will hinder that response. The analysis argues that America needs a well-balanced, medium-weight joint force. It then provides recommendations for each of the services, as well as special operations forces, to achieve that goal. It concludes by describing what is needed to insure our force is capable of the rapid innovation in wartime required of successful nations.     

Japan's Search for the ‘Sweet Spot’: International Cooperation and Regional Security in Northeast Asia

To analyze how Japan's competing objectives and specific policies have been evolving and how they trade off in today's regional security situation, this article argues that shifting Japanese foreign and security policies in Northeast Asia can be understood as ongoing responses to tensions along three key axes. First Japan confronts a tension between bilateralism and multilateralism; second Japan's economic and security interests are often at odds, and third, Japan still struggles with the competing pulls exerted by Asia on the one hand and the West (most particularly the United States) on the other.     

First Priorities in Military Professionalism

This article contends that it is time for the armed forces to revisit their schools, day rooms, wardrooms, squadron meeting places, headquarters, bases and posts to increase the level of awareness and the teaching of professional norms.     

Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters

West Africa piracy is the most profitable in the world. Well-organized gangs steal refined oil in contrast to Somali pirates who hold crews and ships for ransom. Like piracy elsewhere, the origins and potential solutions to West African piracy are found ashore—largely in Nigeria. This article argues that oil states in the developing world are shielded from the domestic and international pressures that can bring down their non-oil neighbors. The current international system which makes international recognition, not internal legitimacy or functionality, the key to state authority works to their benefit. It encourages those parts which are valuable to industrialized powers—and to the domestic elites who facilitate and benefit from international legitimization—to function well enough for resource extraction to continue. The security of the state generally matters less than the security of key enclaves— including ships and offshore platforms—which support elite interests.     

Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality

The article argues that Islamist terror is driven by irrational forces; it analyzes jihadist values and doctrines that animate Islamic revolutionaries; it then contends that jihadist movements go through a cycle of mobilization, extremism, implosion and recreation. Finally, it assesses the prospects for jihadist revitalization, extremism, and decline in Syria and the Sahel. Examples from the Iraqi and Algerian jihadist campaigns are used for illustrative purposes throughout.     

Iranian Involvement in Yemen

For at least a decade, there have been numerous Yemeni, Saudi, and other countries’ assertions that Iran has been involved in supporting northern Yemeni rebels seeking autonomy from the Sana’a government. Iranian diplomatic and political support for this rebellious group (known as the Houthis) is undeniable, but Iranian military assistance for them has not always been easy to prove. This situation appeared to change in 2011 when Iran's increased involvement in Yemen occurred in response to both the chaotic situation there during the final year of the Saleh regime and the danger that the Arab Spring revolutions would leave Iran increasingly isolated. Evidence of Iranian efforts to supply weapons to the Houthis now seems overwhelming in contrast to uncertain reports prior to 2011. In addition, at least some of Yemen's southern secessionists also appear to be receiving at least limited Iranian financial support.     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.