AbstractThrough a qualitative analysis of three air disasters from Asia in recent years—MH370, MH17 and QZ8501—this article investigates the puzzle of how aviation disasters open up a sovereign state’s domestic governance and foreign policy to international questioning within an anarchic international system. This enquiry thereby highlights the gaps in the global governance of aviation, particularly in the areas of safety and recovery in the wake of aviation disasters. Three linked literatures demonstrate this dynamic. First, aligned with the ‘emotional turn’ in international relations, we show that the portrayal of air disasters and grieving next of kin in global media highlights the politics of grief and trauma. Second, aviation disasters surface the politics of disaster diplomacy in the guise of ‘security competition by proxy’ in the recovery process. Third, we emphasize that these shortfalls in domestic governance and international cooperation demonstrated by the attention-grabbing spectacle of aviation disasters consequently underscore important knowledge, norms and compliance gaps in global aviation governance. Aviation disasters and their aftermath thus shine an international spotlight on the state’s domestic governance and foreign policies in these three manners. 相似文献
This article addresses the puzzle of electoral support for corrupt politicians in emerging democracies by examining citizens’ varying attitudes toward political corruption. We make an important theoretical distinction between perceptions of and tolerance for corruption, and argue that these different attitudes vary across individuals depending on whether they are political insiders or outsiders. We test our theory using Afrobarometer survey data from 18 sub‐Saharan African countries and find that individuals included within clientelistic networks simultaneously perceive corruption as ubiquitous and are more tolerant of malfeasance. Meanwhile, those individuals with partisan or ethnic ties to the incumbent are less likely to consider corruption as widespread. Finally, we explore whether variation in attitudes toward corruption influences citizens’ voting behavior, and find that insiders are less likely to “vote the rascals out.” 相似文献
The aim of this study was to evaluate the applicability of Cameriere’s European formula for age estimation in children in South China and to adapt the formula to establish a more suitable formula for these children. Moreover, the performance of dental age estimation based on Cameriere’s method combining the developmental information of permanent teeth (PT) and third molar (TM) was also analysed. Orthopantomographs of 720 healthy children in Group A, and orthopantomographs of 320 children and 280 subadults in Group B were assessed. The samples of Group A were divided into training dataset 1 and test dataset 1, and the samples of Group B were also divided into training dataset 2 and test dataset 2. A South China-specific formula was established based on the training dataset 1, and the comparison of accuracy between the Cameriere’s European formula and the South China-specific formula was conducted with the test dataset 1. Additionally, a PT regression model, a TM regression model, and a combined regression model (PT + TM) were established based on the training dataset 2, and the performance of these three models were validated on the test dataset 2. The Cameriere’s European formula underestimated chronological age with a mean difference (ME) of −0.47 ± 1.11 years in males and −0.69 ± 1.19 years in females. However, the South China-specific formula underestimated chronological age, with a mean difference (ME) of −0.02 ± 0.71 years in males and −0.14 ± 0.73 years in females. Compared with PT model and TM model, the PT and TM combined model obtained the smallest root mean square error (RMSE) of 1.29 years in males and 0.93 years in females. In conclusion, the South China-specific formula was more suitable for assessing the dental age of children in South China, and the PT and TM combined model can improve the accuracy of dental age estimation in children.
Key points
Orthopantomographs of 720 healthy children in Group A, and orthopantomographs of 320 children and 280 subadults in Group B were assessed.
A South China-specific formula was established based on the training dataset 1, and the comparison of accuracy between the Cameriere’s European formula and the South China-specific formula was conducted with the test dataset 1.
A PT regression model, a TM regression model, and a combined regression model (PT + TM) were established based on the training dataset 2, and the performance of these three models were validated on the test dataset 2.
The South China-specific formula was more suitable for assessing the dental age of children in South China, and the PT and TM combined model can improve the accuracy of dental age estimation in children.
This paper aims to explore various possibilities in the evolving global gas market by constructing game-theoretical models involving the major players: Russia and Qatar exporting gas to the Asia-Pacific and Europe, respectively. We explore a series of hypothetical scenarios based on competitive and collusive settings for the Asia-Pacific LNG market and based on Qatar’s export route to the European gas market. The scenarios that are examined are (1) Russia as the follower and Qatar as the leader in a Stackelberg game; (2) Russia and Qatar as Cournot competitors; (3) collaboration between Russia and Qatar as bilateral monopolies; (4) Qatar exporting gas to European borders; (5) Qatar exporting gas to the last transit country; and (6) Qatar transporting gas to the Turkish border under a multi-pricing scheme. Demand is estimated under each scenario to simulate the respective export volumes, prices and quantities, and profit in each scenario. By exploring these market interactions, we find that it is essential for Russia to strike a deal with Qatar in the Asian market and accelerate their gas production in order to compete as an LNG market leader. Russia is likely to benefit more if it can link with Qatar to act as a monopoly on their segmental demand curve. On the other hand, Qatar’s profit is expected to be higher under the scenario when Qatar sells all the gas to the last transit country as the sole demand point instead of passing through transit countries.