Chinese Prosperity Doesn't Bring Democracy

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

我国社会养老保险替代率的地区差异及其影响因素研究

本文分析了我国城镇职工基本养老保险制度的养老金收入替代率、缴费替代率以及替代率实现程度的地区差异,并进一步通过建模对影响替代率地区差异的因素进行了回归分析。本文的主要研究发现包括:(1)养老金的收入替代率与经济发展水平成反比,虽然与缴费替代率成正比,但普遍低于缴费替代率。这说明我国城镇职工养老金的给付部分延续了工资的效率性,且养老金水平有被低估的可能;(2)从东、中、西部区域分布看,我国养老金替代率呈现出区域差异缩小、区内差异增大的特点,这说明传统上按区位属性予以养老保险财政补助的方式有待改进;(3)制度覆盖率、缴费率和制度抚养比对收入替代率的绝对水平和相对水平的影响较为复杂,类似的统计结果可能对应不同的政策效应;(4)鉴于我国城镇职工基本养老保险制度的个人账户仍处于积累阶段,因而基金积累能力对于养老金替代率的效应仍有待进一步检验。     

The heart of Asia and the roof of the world

This article concentrates almost entirely on the events of 1971 and the author's involvement in the “sometimes complicated and frustrating negotiations and consultations” which led up to the signing at the end of 1971 of the various Treaties of Friendship as Britain withdrew from the Gulf, leaving behind a number of independent states, including the United Arab Emirates.     

Managerialist advocate or “control freak”? The Janus‐faced Office of the Auditor General

Abstract: This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the office's Janus‐like character as both a managerialist advocate and “control freak.” This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge‐basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of “institutional schizophrenia” are identified: the OAG'S mandate in relation to financial and value‐for‐money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAG'S institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the “negative” and “positive” dimensions of the office's mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultant's role of the OAG in relation to VFMA. Sommaire: Le but de cet article est de mettre en relief les contradictions dans le rôle du Bureau du vérificateur général (BVG) et d'identifier les causes et les conséquences du caractére schizoïde du Bureau qui est à la fois partisan du managérialisme et obsédé du contrôle. Ce caractère spécifique du Bureau est façonné par des facteurs institutionnels et le type de connaissance dont il dépend pour remplir sa mission. Trois causes de schizophrénie institutionnelle sont identifées:le mandat du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification financière et l'optimisation des ressources; l'interaction entre la perméabilité institutionnelle du Bureau et la structure du marché du conseil en management; et les tensions entre les dimensions positives et négatives du mandat du Bureau. En ce qui conceme les conséquences, cet article aborde trois aspects:l'incapacité du BVG À développer une position cohérente à l'endroit du managérialisme; le fait que la promotion d'idées managérialistes amène le BVG À s'impliquer dans la sphère politique, et la fragilité du professionalisme en tant que comme mécanisme pour réguler le rôle de consultant du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification d'optimisation des ressources.     

Interests,Instruments and Institutional Preferences in the EU Comitology System: The 2006 Comitology Reform

This paper seeks to reveal the institutional interests of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission in the comitology system. This is done by an investigation of the 2006 comitology reform, which introduced the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This reform was the result of developments in four areas: the Lamfalussy reform in the area of financial regulation; the controversial use of comitology in the area of GMOs, food safety and the environment; the failed Constitutional Treaty; and the amending of the 1999 comitology decision. The analysis shows that the reform was the result of a two‐dimensional constitutional struggle. The first dimension concerns the relative supervisory position of the two legislative actors, the Council and the European Parliament. The second dimension concerns the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch of the EU system. In theoretical terms, the analysis demonstrates an example of T.M. Moe's ‘politics of structural choice’. The paper ends by drawing lessons for the negotiations on the new comitology system following the Lisbon Treaty.