The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.     

Advancing measures of innovation in the United States

This paper introduces major themes addressed in this special issue, which is based on NSF's Division of Science Resources Statistics (SRS) workshop Advancing Measures of Innovation—Knowledge Flows, Business Metrics, and Measurement Strategies, held on June 6-7, 2006 near Washington, D.C. The first two sections describe the workshop and provide a brief background on R & D and innovation metrics. The last section introduces the papers. They are based on selected workshop presentations along with additional invited papers.

A Calming Influence

A shimmering movement rustles millions of leaves and the trees seem to have taken on a life of their own.There was no wind blowing,which could only mean one thing.Birds—lots of them.The thousands of egrets that infest the dense forest at the entrance to the mystical Qingcheng Mountain are more