ALIENATION IN PRISON ORGANIZATIONS:

The deprivation modelsuggests that prisonization and inmate opposition the prison organization are a function of the deprivations imposed by organization. Compliance theory maintains that alienationof the organiza tionf participants covaries with the coerciveness of the organization. Data obtained from inmates and officers in six adult correctional institutions are examined to test the hypothesis that inmate alienation is a result of the coer civeness of the institution and a cause of inmate opposition to the institu tion. The findings lend support to the hypothesized model and, further more, suggest the need to distinguish between absolute and relative deprivation.     

SOCIAL INTEGRATION, VICTIMIZATION, AND ANOMIA

Durkheim argues that anomie occurs as a result of some temporary or longterm crisis that disturbs the collective order. Yet, at the individual level an event or events must be perceived as affecting immediate social relationships before anomia occurs. Previous victimization research reports suggest that crimes may cause interaction problems for the victims. This passibility was analyzed using two notional samples collected by the Notional Opinion Research Center in 1973 and 1974. Using regression to analyze the impact of robbery and burglary on anomia scores no significant relations were found. Bath are usually non-recurrent experiences that either do not have long-term effects on individuls, or anomia as measured here is too far removed to serve as an adequate measure.     

THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN FEDERAL COURTS: 1980–1998*

Research Summary: This study reports findings from the American Terrorism Study. The data show that from 1980 to 1998, the U.S. government periodically tried accused domestic and international terrorists through the use of traditional criminal trials. The extent to which federal prosecutors “explicit politicized” these trials (and the success that the politicization had) varied among the types of terrorist groups. Explicit politically was not found to be successful in trials of domestic terrorists but seemed to work for trials involving international terrorists. Over the 20‐year period, however, federal prosecutors began to rely more heavily (and more successfully) on the politicization of the criminal acts by international terrorists. The results also show that international terrorists, like their domestic counterparts, are much less likely to plead guilty. Finally, the study shows that these traditional trials have resulted in international terrorists being punished more severely than domestic terrorists. Unfortunately, the practice of performing these politicized trials within the venue of the federal court system may have been compromised by defense strategies that capitalized on the due process procedures so prominent in the U.S. system of justice. In the wake of the terrorism attacks in September 2001 by foreign nationals, the federal government began to take the next step in its “war against terrorism” by instituting the use of military tribunals. Policy Implications: Although the federal government has been relatively successful in the prosecution of terrorism in America in the past two decades, the movement toward the use of military tribunals has perhaps become inevitable (as the use of the traditional criminal trial for international terrorists manifests weaknesses). In the short term, it is likely that several international terrorism cases stemming from the September 2001 attacks and other subsequent attacks (which may be presumed) will be tried in federal courthouses across the country (even with the advent of military tribunals). Federal prosecutors will need to be trained on the specifics of trying these kinds of cases. In the long term, the use of military tribunals will provide greater ease of prosecution for the federal government. Long‐term consequences such as retaliatory attacks and attacks aimed at the release of political prisoners cannot be ignored by policy makers.     

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS: THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AND SCREENING DECISIONS ON JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS

Research on race, sex, and social class discrimination in the juvenile justice process has yielded mixed results. These conflicting findings have been attributed to the use of diverse research strategies and various methodological shortcomings. There are, however, two potentially important issues that have not been previously addressed: the need to examine the juvenile justice system as a process, rather than as a series of separate and unrelated decision points, and the failure to control for the impact of administrative factors such as pretrial detention. The purpose of the research reported here is to examine the impact of race, sex, and social class on juvenile court dispositions while controlling for pretrial detention and appropriate legal factors. The analytical strategy employed permits an examination of the impact of these factors over three stages of the juvenile justice process: referral, adjudication, and disposition.
Findings indicate that while legal factors and pretrial detention decline in importance as predictors of disposition as one moves from an examination of all referred to adjudicated youth, race and social class become more important. These results are discussed in terms of their methodological significance and their implications for the conceptualization of discrimination in the juvenile justice process.     

Does Chevron Matter?

In this article we evaluate whether the Supreme Court's much-discussed decision in Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) signaled a lasting difference in how the justices decide administrative law cases, by comparing and testing the predictions of three distinct theories of Supreme Court behavior. The legal model predicts an increase in deference to administrative agencies. This prediction is shared by the jurisprudential regime model, which also predicts that the justices evaluate key case factors differently before and after Chevron . The attitudinal model predicts no change in the justices' behavior as a result of Chevron . Although we find that attitudes matter, the fact that we also find support for the legal and jurisprudential regime models undermines the assertion of the attitudinal model that law cannot explain Supreme Court votes on the merits.     

PUNISHING POLITICAL OFFENDERS: THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL MOTIVE ON FEDERAL SENTENCING DECISIONS*

Although political motive is frequently avoided as an issue in the prosecution of terrorists, previous research indicates that these offenders consistently receive longer sentences than nonterrorists convicted of similar offenses (Smith, 1994). This study assesses the ability of three theoretical models (consensus, conflict, and structural-contextual) to explain these differences in sentencing patterns. Data on terrorists (N = 95), provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, is matched with data on a sample of similarly convicted nonterrorists from the Federal Court Cases Integrated Data Base, 1970-1991 (N = 403). Controlling for a number of demographic and sentencing-related variables, the results indicate that the official label of “terrorist” is not only a significant predictor of sentence length, but emerges as the dominant explanatory variable in the analysis. The results provide general support for both consensus and conflict hypotheses, but only partial support for structural-contextual theory. The findings also raise procedural questions regarding the extensive variation in sentencing between similarly situated defendants when political motive is used as a primary criterion for sentence enhancements.