RECONSIDERING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL COMPOSITION AND WHITES’ PERCEPTIONS OF VICTIMIZATION RISK: DO RACIAL STEREOTYPES MATTER?*

Recent theoretical extensions of threat theory have posited that Whites frequently view Blacks as a criminal threat because of stereotypes linking race and crime. Several studies have found indirect support for this hypothesis and have shown that the percentage of neighborhood residents who are Black is positively associated with the perceptions of victimization risk and fear of crime by White residents. To date, however, little research has investigated whether, as theory would suggest, this relationship is either a consequence of or is contingent on Whites holding stereotypes of Blacks as criminals. In this article, we address this issue by examining whether racial typification of crime mediates or moderates the relationships between static and dynamic measures of neighborhood racial composition and the perceptions of victimization risk by Whites. The results offer mixed support for the threat hypothesis and show that racial typification of crime conditions the relationship between perceived changes in neighborhood racial composition and the perceptions of victimization risk by Whites, but neither explains nor influences the association between static measures of racial composition and the latter. The implications of the findings for threat theory and research are discussed.     

Pharmaceutical regulation in Denmark and the UK: Reformulating interest representation to the transnational level

Abstract. Common elements are recognised across Denmark and the UK in regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, which are attributed to the impact of associational action at the sector level. Our examination of arrangements for regulating medicine prices and information displays many of the hallmarks of neo-corporatism – namely negotiation with state agencies, compliance seeking among members, and policy implementation through acting as a Private Interest Government. During a period of economic internationalisation and directive international agencies, we show how business interests have reformulated to transnational levels, with associations, despite facing a greater complexity of interests to represent, having a strong impact upon regulatory outcomes. These have been neither wholly deregulatory or reregulatory, but partly reflect events at national levels. This may predict regulatory developments at the European level in other sectors.     

Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors

When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the “staring match” logic captured by divide‐the‐dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.