DRUG TESTING FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS ON PAROLE: AN EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION*

Research Summary: The present experimental study examined parole outcomes and arrests for 1,958 California Youth Authority parolees, randomly assigned to levels of routine drug testing ranging from “no testing” to two tests per month. Results showed no improved outcomes from more frequent drug testing. Early positive drug tests, however, indicated increased risk of recidivism. Policy Implications: Although limited in its scope, this study provided experimental evidence that little crime‐reduction benefit of routine drug testing above a minimum level exists for regular parolees. However, drug testing may serve as a relatively straightforward risk assessment procedure for future criminal behavior.     

Genetics and Criminal Behavior Evidence Through the End of the 1970s

Research reported up through and including the 1970s directly bearing upon the relationship between genetics and criminality is reviewed. Studies using four classes of research designs are considered: general pedigree (or family) studies, twin studies, karyotype studies, and adoption studies. Only the latter three offer solid evidence at least consistent with a partial genetic etiological hypothesis, and of these, only one type of karyotype study and the adoption studies appear to be on the verge of definitely settling the matter. Among the fairly definitive types of studies, most of the evidence is extremely supportive of the proposition that human variation in tendencies to commit criminal behavior is significantly affected by some genetic factors.     

OF POLITICS AND PURPOSE: POLITICAL SALIENCE AND GOAL AMBIGUITY OF US FEDERAL AGENCIES

As scholars have observed, government agencies have ambiguous goals. Very few large sample empirical studies, however, have tested such assertions and analysed variations among organizations in the characteristics of their goals. Researchers have developed concepts of organizational goal ambiguity, including 'evaluative goal ambiguity', and 'priority goal ambiguity', and found that these goal ambiguity variables related meaningfully to financial publicness (the degree of government funding versus prices or user charges), regulatory responsibility, and other variables. This study analyses the influence of the external political environment (external political authorities and processes) on goal ambiguity in government agencies; many researchers have analysed external influences on government bureaucracies, but very few have examined the effects on the characteristics of the organizations, such as their goals. This analysis of 115 US federal agencies indicates that higher 'political salience' to Congress, the president, and the media, relates to higher levels of goal ambiguity. A newly developed analytical framework for the analysis includes components for external environmental influences, organizational characteristics, and managerial influences, with new variables that represent components of the framework. Higher levels of political salience relate to higher levels of both types of goal ambiguity; components of the framework, however, relate differently to evaluative goal ambiguity than to priority goal ambiguity. The results contribute evidence of the viability of the goal ambiguity variables and the political environment variables. The results also show the value of bringing together concepts from organization theory and political science to study the effects of political environments on characteristics of government agencies.     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.