A Review of: “Thomas Hegghammer. Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979.”

Charles King, Ending Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 308. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. 94, notes. ISBN 0–19–829343–7, £14.99. ISSN 0567–932X.

Michael Howard, George J Andreopoulos and Mark R Shulman (eds.), The Laws of War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. Pp. vii + 303, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 0–300–05899–3 (hb), £22.50; ISBN 0–300–07062–4 (pbk) £11.95.

Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (eds.), Encyclopedia of World Terrorism. Armonk: Sharpe Reference, 1997, 3 vols. Pp 768. illustrations, bibliography; general, names and geographical indexes. ISBN 56324–806–9 (hbk) £275.     

Non-Alignment and Beyond: India’s Interest in Latin America, 1961–1972

ABSTRACT

Between 1961 and 1972, Latin America came to capture India’s diplomatic imagination. Officials within India’s Ministry of External Affairs identified strengthened ties with the region as a way to augment, restrain, and transcend the Non-Aligned Movement, further India’s international prestige and political influence, spread Indian culture, and bolster India’s economy. India’s interest in Latin America climaxed after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi prioritised the region and Pakistan strengthened diplomatic relations with Panama in autmn 1967. Yet uncertainty over the internal realities of Latin America hindered any Indian pivot. In the end, India’s aspirations for Latin America failed to materialise.     

What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System

This paper assesses the relative importance of force employment as a cause of military victory. It focuses on the adoption of the modern system in interstate wars since 1917. Using cases, contingency tables, and regression analysis, we find that war participants who use the modern system are significantly more likely to succeed in decisive battlefield engagements. However, the modern system does not predict victory at a higher rate than more traditional unit-level explanations for combat effectiveness, suggesting that it might function as a causal mechanism linking factors like regime type and material endowments with martial capabilities. Exploring the possible links between unit-level explanations of military power and the organizational-level force employment indicators, we find that more materially powerful states and democracies tend to implement the modern system at a higher rate than other types of actors, but more extreme autocracies also frequently adopt. Combined, these findings suggest the relevance of continuing to explore how organizational-level variables impact military effectiveness.     

Jokes and their relation to the mode of production

Abstract

The governmentality literature offers a host of insights into liberal modes of government. A key theme in this literature is that the economy came to be seen as an autonomous domain requiring its own form of governmental reason. Yet the emergence of the economy has never been specified, in terms of both what would constitute an economy and how it was constituted. Instead, the appearance of an economy has been conflated with the general rise of liberal understandings of agency. In this paper I seek to provide an alternative and more precise account. This involves showing how the importance of Smith lies not so much in his formulation of a liberal version of agency, but in the disjunction he introduces between reason of state and political oeconomy. Crucially, despite his significance, Smith's arguments do not usher in an economy. For that event we have to wait for Ricardo's problematic of distribution. This alternative account is intended to weaken the association of the rise of liberal government with the emergence of the economy as an object of thought.     

What's at stake? A veto-player theory of voter turnout

Turnout is theorized to reflect elections' policy stakes. All else equal, a highly constrained policymaking context is expected to lower the potential policy stakes of a given election. This study tests if such contexts, which are characterized by multiple veto players, reduce electoral participation. According to time-series cross-sectional autoregressive dynamic lag models of turnout in 311 elections in 21 advanced industrialized democracies, additional veto players decrease turnout in both the short and long run. Moreover, the results suggest veto players conceptually fine-tune and empirically contribute to existing models of cross-national turnout. Hence this study has crucial implications for the students of electoral participation and scholars interested in the democratic outcomes of institutional design.     

Campaign Activism and the Spatial Model: Getting Beyond Extremism to Explain Policy Motivated Participation

To date, most models of policy motivated campaign participation claim participation derives from the intensity or extremism of one’s policy views. I approach the policy motivation differently, generalizing the logic of proximity voting to model policy motivated campaign participation. Modeling participation as a function of extremism captures the activist’s policy preferences and suggests those with strong preferences participate more, while modeling participation as a function of proximity captures both the activist’s policy preferences and the relevant comparisons to the positions of the candidates. Noting the two alternatives lead to different predictions about variation in individual participation beyond turnout (e.g. campaign activities), I find consistent support for a proximity model of activism and I find no independent effect of extremism once I control for proximity. Moreover, the proximity model’s predictions about ideological responsiveness to changes in the candidates’ locations over time prove robust, while predictions based solely on ideological extremism do not.

Using Booking Data to Model Drug User Arrest Rates: A Preliminary to Estimating the Prevalence of Chronic Drug Use

Public policy is often concerned with the size and characteristics of special populations that are difficult to reach in household surveys. Chronic drug users, who often live outside conventional households, provide the illustration motivating this paper. An alternative to household surveys is to question chronic drug users where they congregate—jails, treatment programs, and shelters, for example. Using such opportunistic data for prevalence estimation raises difficult problems for statistical inference: Study subjects who arrive at the collection points cannot be deemed a random sample of the general population. However, if we could estimate the rates at which chronic drug users arrive at the collection points, then we could use those estimates to weight the sample to represent the population. This paper presents a modified Poisson mixture model used to estimate the stochastic process that accounts for how chronic drug users get arrested. It uses that model to estimate arrest rates for 38 counties using up to sixteen quarters of data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring survey.