The normative foundation of social science in law revisited: A reply to melton

Conclusion The primary thrust of Melton's argument is that opposition by organized psychology to the Bork nomination would have been consistent with the jurisprudential philosophy on which social science in law, as a scholarly movement, is based (p. 317). If APA is to justify opposition to Bork or future Supreme Court nominations (e.g., Souter), there should be a clearly identified normative foundation that directly leads to such advocacy. A stance based partly upon scholarship thatimplies reverence for constitutional values and partly upon preambles and principles of an ethical code is too slender a reed from which to cast APA's institutional support for a Supreme Court candidate. When such a stance is adopted, APA unfortunately becomes one of an increasing number of organizations attempting to influence political decisions by claiming allegiance to values consistent with democracy.Advocacy based on a normative foundation of social science in law jurisprudence could be justified by APA if, and only if, (a) there is an identifiable SSL jurisprudence, (b) there is consensus on the values underlying such a jurisprudence, and (c) adherence to these values argues against the nomination of Bork or others (e.g., Souter) to the Supreme Court. Because these conditions currently cannot be met, organized opposition to Supreme Court nominations cannot be justified on a normative foundation of SSL jurisprudence.Editor's Note: This issue marks the introduction of theComments section. Readers are invited to submit brief comments on articles published in this journal.     

Baker & McKenzie's regular article tracking developments in EU law relating to IP, IT and telecommunications

This is the latest edition of Baker & McKenzie's column on developments in EU law relating to IP, IT and telecommunications. This article summarises recent developments that are considered important for practitioners, students and academics in a wide range of information technology, e-commerce, telecommunications and intellectual property areas. It cannot be exhaustive but intends to address the important points. This is a hard copy reference guide, but links to outside web sites are included where possible. No responsibility is assumed for the accuracy of information contained in these links.     

Undergraduate Education in Legal Psychology

The purpose of this article is to describe ways that legal psychology can be introduced into the undergraduate curriculum. The extent to which undergraduate psychology and law courses are currently a part of the curriculum is described, and a model is proposed for coursework in a Psychology Department that might adequately reflect coverage of the legal area. The role of legal psychology in interdisciplinary programs and Criminal Justice departments is discussed. Sources for teaching aids and curricular materials are described.     

Navigating the principle of open court in the digital age: The more things change,the more they stay the same

The belief that courts should be open to the public is a guiding principle of the Canadian legal system. This article examines the principle of open court in the digital age by analyzing policies governing live text‐based communication in Canadian courtrooms. We argue that courts have and have not responded to the changing digital landscape. While Canadian journalists have the ability to use live text‐based communication in courts, the general public does not despite new affordances provided to them by digital technologies. This article explores the tensions between administrative judicial independence, open court, and digital technology.     

Everyday Life and Legal Values: A Concept Paper

This concept paper emerged from a Law and Human Behavior (LHB) Workshop, that was called by the journal's Editor, Richard Wiener, and held at St. Louis University on March 19–21, 1999. This workshop, which brought together 22 scholars and researchers in legal psychology, was part of James Ogloff's Presidential Initiative Project for the American Psychology/Law Society, and was supported by St. Louis University and an NSF grant. Prior to our arrival, each participant answered queries from the Editor about LHB and the field of psychology and law, and each was asked to offer five topics that were underrepresented in the journal or that we would like to see addressed in future issues. At the workshop, we were assigned to small groups, and the authors of this paper constituted one such group. The charge for all groups was to develop plans for encouraging submissions in areas of psycholegal scholarship that continue to be infrequent topics of investigation, and then to develop a concept paper. The direction our group took is captured by our title, Everyday Life and Legal Values, and within this paper we explicate the topic, identify a number of underrepresented research areas, suggest some research paradigms for investigating them, and present this within a perspectival directions frame that ties established lines of research to the newer ones we propose.     

The forensic taxonomic debate on Cannabis: semantic hokum.

It has been asserted that there are legal species of marihuana plants, and this contention has generated frequent court challenges of criminal prosecutions involving marihuana. Invariably the claim is made that the name C. sativa used in legislation is insufficiently comprehensive to proscribe all forms of marihuana. The maneuver being used, alarmingly, is potentially applicable to innumerable other materials, but its success is based on a failure to appreciate the subjective nature of taxonomy and the little-known but critical ambiguities which are inherent in scientific names. The complex principles and operational conventions of biological nomenclature are presented in elementary fashion. Despite important technical constraints on the use of scientific names, some facts are clear: these names are used subjectively, they may be highly ambiguous, the consensus on use of these names is liable to change with time and, most important, quite permissibly they may have substantially different meanings to different users. The claim that there are legal species of Cannabis merely amounts to a semantic ploy in which certain of the variants of Cannabis that have customarily been understood to be denoted by the species name C. sativa, and which are clearly understood to be proscribed, are simply arbitrarily redefined as different species. This ploy has proven unsuccessful in all cases where scientific evidence was adequately presented by the state and in all important court cases where the issue was critically examined.