The impact of a gasoline tax on auto exhaust emissions

The EPA implements its policy of exhaust emission control by setting standards specified in terms of grams of pollutants per mile traveled. As a result, the tax must first restrain the vehicle miles traveled (VMT) if it is to have an impact on emission at all. EPA's choice of miles traveled as the medium through which its policy of pollution control must run is unfortunate, because travel is an activity that people resist giving up. This is reflected in a low long-run price elasticity of travel demand. Consequently, it takes substantial increases in the gasoline tax to make an impact on long-run travel demand. Simulation results show that under an alternative policy option, where EPA's standards are specified in terms of grams of pollutant per gallon of fuel burned, the same long-run reduction in exhaust emissions achievable today can be achieved (at an even higher level of confidence) with less than one-tenth of the increase in gasoline price required under the existing policy regime.     

Psychological obstacles to administrative responsibility: Lessons of the MOVE disaster

Investigative bodies and other observers have attributed much of the blame for the 1985 MOVE catastrophe in Philadelphia to ineffective management by the city's previously successful mayor, W. Wilson Goode. Goode's behavior toward the disruptive extremist group followed two patterns, both paradoxical: protracted delay followed by excessive haste, and arms-length action that contrasted sharply with his usual hands-on management style. Drawing on the theory of decisionmaking developed by Irving Janis and Leon Mann, this paper suggests that both paradoxes resulted from unresolved decisional conflicts that impeded responsible and rational handling of the problem. The case points to the value of devoting more attention to the psychology of decision-making in educating present and future public managers.     

THE BEHAVIOUR OF LEGISLATORS AND BUREAUCRATS AND POLICING EXPENDITURES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS*

Abstract: This paper is concerned with an analysis of legislation, public administration and government expenditure decisions on policing activities. These three dimensions of government can be used as mechanisms of social control. Whether they are or not is an empirical question that has to be determined in each case. It is shown that there are no strict relationships between the three dimensions of government activity: separate decision-making is undertaken for each of the three dimensions. It is indicated that there are eight possible combinations of the three dimensions, assuming that the three dimensions of government activity are bivariate and discrete. The empirical analysis relates to the state of Queensland and it is concluded that Queensland can be described as a case consisting of authoritarian legislation, public administration contrary to the rule of law, and low policing expenditures.     

NGOs and Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from the Work of the Project on Ethnic Relations in the Balkans

This article examines the impact of nongovernmental organization-sponsored contact and communication on fostering peaceful solutions to ethnic conflict via case studies of the activities of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) in Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia. It explores five operational principles that guide PER activity: creating credible, neutral forums for dialogue; maintaining momentum; working within political realities; encouraging indigenous solutions from within existing processes; and acting with the backing of powerful states. These principles explain PER's success as a "weak mediator" of ethnic conflicts. According to this analysis, PER also exhibits organizational characteristics that contribute to success, including nonpartisanship, area expertise and extensive networks of local contacts, and an ability to secure the trust of local actors.
A significant indicator of the success of PER activities is the establishment by conflicting parties of institutionalized mechanisms for addressing their differences. Contrary to the view that electoral competition contributes to conflict, this study finds that the possibility of achieving an electoral advantage by participating cooperatively in conflict resolution activities creates incentives for local actors to recognize opportunities offered by PER activities and leads local actors to heed PER's advice. Finally, the article offers a cautionary observation. While PER's perceived influence with major international actors may contribute to its local successes, once a state actor with the power to impose a solution has committed itself to ending a conflict, its preferences outweigh any local interests in determining the outcome and renders the efforts of a "weak mediator" such as PER irrelevant.