Multicultural Institutions,Distributional Politics,and Postelectoral Mobilization in Indigenous Mexico

Contrary to the predictions of “power sharing” to mitigate ethnic conflicts, multicultural rights recognition can actually increase the frequency of local postelectoral mobilizations. This article demonstrates that the adoption of an ethnic rights regime for electing local government representatives may actually increase conflict if these multicultural laws are not carefully circumscribed to avoid violating human rights. Focusing on the 1995 multicultural rights reforms in Oaxaca, it presents evidence that legal changes purportedly implemented to recognize indigenous rights actually increased postelectoral disputes due to conflicts between county seat communities and peripheral population hamlets over access to funding by the central government. Based on this finding, the article addresses normative implications of “power‐sharing” multiculturalism, recommending that multicultural laws be implemented only together with legal mechanisms to solve postelectoral disputes.     

Paradigmatic Contestation and the Persistence of Perennial Dualities

Schram, S. F. and Caterino, B. (eds) (2006) Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Methods . New York: New York University Press.     

CIA's Leadership and Major Covert Operations: Rogue Elephants or Risk-Averse Bureaucrats?

The Central Intelligence Agency has often been accused of distorting intelligence analysis to encourage covert operations. However, there has been little systematic research done to determine, 1) if this problem actually exists, 2) whether it is better or worse under certain circumstances and, 3) what, if anything, can be done. I start by demonstrating that, in fact, the attitude of CIA leaders towards covert operations does cause them to distort the intelligence they deliver to policymakers. I test three hypotheses which attempt to explain why leaders' concern for promoting the Agency's interests leads them to adopt a particular form of bias at a particular time. Finally, I offer recommendations for mitigating the causes and effects of distorted intelligence.     

The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC

This paper investigates persuasion as a means of influence for the Federal Reserve Chairman in meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Using textual records of FOMC meetings, federal funds rate targets have been recorded for Committee members who served in the Arthur Burns era (1970–1978). Results show that Burns-member differences in stated funds rate targets were lower when Burns made recommendations early in the meeting, consistent with the hypothesis that the Chairman is persuasive. Additional results show that members’ tendencies to respond to Burns's recommendations were related to their personal and political loyalties.     

On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option

We examine whether nations, faced with the threat of terrorism, will be motivated to engage in the efficient amount of retaliation against terrorists. We demonstrate that the problem confronting the efforts of nations to achieve an optimal retaliation against terrorists is understated by the traditional free-rider analysis. In particular, nations have the option of actually selling or reducing the public good of retaliation, provided through the efforts of others, by offering safe havens to terrorists in return for the terrorists' pledge to attack elsewhere. This paid-rider behavior is also shown to apply to other public good scenarios.The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Gordon Tullock on an earlier draft. Sole responsibility for the paper's content rests with the authors. Todd Sandler's research was supported by a Science and Humanities Research Institute Summer Grant at Iowa State University.     

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN CORRECTIONS

Electronic monitoring is a recent advance in information gathering for correctional program administration. To be effective in achieving correctional goals, electronic monitors must be applied to offenders when there is some risk of performance problem. Advocates of electronic monitoring argue they can promote public safety, save tax dollars, and enhance correctional performance. Because corrections systems find it so difficult to innovate with offenders who represent a risk to society, these claims are overstated. Electronic monitoring raises short-term concerns concerning damage to correctional program credibility and long-term concerns about the enhancement of social control.