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In this paper a new economic approach to standardization has been presented. Standardization has been regarded as a problem ofgradual choice. An individual chooses to apply more or less standards within a hierarchy of standards. With this decomposition of standards, the problem of strategic market power becomes less important than in the traditional models of standardization. It becomes possible to analyze the problems of network externalities within a framework of non-strategic behavior and to apply the tools of the traditional theory of externalities and public goods. While decentralized action may lead to too little standardization, committees may overcome this deficiency to some extent, but bureaucracies are likely to lead to overstandardization. In the empirical section of the paper it has been shown that our approach can be applied to the standard-setting process in languages, railroads, and telecommunications. In all three cases the tendency of bureaucracies to generate more standardization than committees has been corroborated.The authors are indebted for helpful comments to the participants of the Berlin Seminar on Political Economy and of the colloquium Algemene Economie, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, and to A. Roemer, Saarbrücken. 相似文献
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The article reviews a small monograph by K. Wicksell entitled Our taxes. Who pays them and who should pay them? It sheds some light on why Wicksell, a radical of his time, was so conservative as an economist. This paradox comes because Wicksell, as an economist, is often brought in line with the unanimity principle. Correctly seen, Wicksell pleaded for general franchise and proportional representation under the unanimity constraint. This was a radical proposal in his time because it contributed to shift the burden of taxation from the poor to the rich by implementing the benefit principle.
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A Public-Choice View of Swiss Liberty 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This article compares the provisions of the American and Swissconstitutions from a public-choice perspective. Accordingly,the Swiss Constitution is seen as one designed to bring abouta transmission of citizens' desires into political action, whereasthe U.S. Constitution is designed to prevent the misuse of grantedpower. The specific level of analysis employed here is the principal-agentmodel, which is used to examine collective decisionmaking atthe constitutional, legislative, and para-constitutional levels.The article then considers the role of the courts as arbiterof constitutional questions and conflicts. 相似文献
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It is often said that parliament shouldrepresent the opinions found in thepopulation and that government should beheld accountable for its political program.It is shown that these two goals rely ontwo different basic models of democracywhich are not fully compatible with eachother: the model of a pure representativedemocracy and the model of a pure two partycompetition. Unaccountable governments,voter alienation, strategic voting, andgovernmental instability are shown to beconsequences of this institutional mix.These problems may be avoided with reformsin the direction of one or the other basicmodel. 相似文献
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Charles B. Blankart 《Public Choice》1995,82(1-2):181-184
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