脂肪心的形态学、形态测量学及心肌脂肪含量测定

本文报告100例心脏的形态学、形态测量法及右心室心肌脂肪含量的测定,其中脂肪心58例。根据形态学观察,我们将脂肪心分为4种类型;对脂肪心的发生机理,脂肪心与肥胖和心外膜脂肪组织厚度及心肌内脂肪组织浸润的程度的关系进行了讨论。     

Who is responsible for what? Clarity of responsibilities in multilevel states: The case of Spain

There is a theoretical disagreement between the classical normative positive view on decentralisation, which states that the fragmentation of power shifts policy more closely into line with citizens' preferences, and a more recent critical view that states that decentralisation blurs attribution of responsibility. This disagreement can only be resolved by refining the understanding of specific institutional designs. The theoretical claim in this article is that the relation between multilevel governance and clarity of responsibilities is contingent upon the type of decentralisation in place. To test this proposition, individual data from an asymmetrically decentralised system – the Spanish State of Autonomies – are used. Results show that the relationship between decentralisation and clarity of responsibility has a u‐shape. Responsibility attribution is clearer in regions with high and low levels of decentralisation, where one level of government clearly predominates over the other, than in regions with a more intertwined distribution of powers.     

The cognitive distortions of child molesters are in need of treatment

Abstract

This paper forms the second part of a debate led by Marshall, Marshall, and Kingston (2011) regarding the need to address so-called cognitive distortions in sexual offender treatment. In their paper, Marshall et al. argue that so-called cognitive distortions may not necessarily require intense and focused attention or challenge throughout treatment. In evaluating Marshall et al.'s arguments, we highlight some inherent differences in how both Marshall et al. and ourselves choose to define the term “cognitive distortion”. We surmise that these key definitional differences appear to account for many of the issues that we “debate”. In particular, for example, Marshall et al. focus their arguments regarding cognitive distortions more explicitly upon excuses, denial and minimisations, whereas we choose to focus upon schemas and higher-order belief structures. Thus, we argue that the broadness and vagueness of the term “cognitive distortion” can lend itself to quite different interpretations and research foci. We offer some alternative views to Marshall et al.'s position and advocate the consideration of cognitions with an aetiological role in offending. We conclude with some suggestions for future research and treatment.     

The Question of Evil and Feminist Legal Scholarship

In this article, we argue that feminist legal scholars should engage directly and explicitly with the question of evil. Part I summarises key facts surrounding the prosecution and life-long imprisonment of Myra Hindley, one of a tiny number of women involved in multiple killings of children in recent British history. Part II reviews a range of commentaries on Hindley, noting in particular the repeated use of two narratives: the first of these insists that Hindley is an icon of female evil; the second, less popular one, seeks to position her as a victim. In Part III, the article broadens out and we explain why we think feminist legal scholars should look at the question of evil. In large part, the emphasis is on anticipating the range of possible objections to this argument, and on trying to answer these objections by showing how a focus on evil might benefit feminist legal thinking – specifically in relation to the categories of perpetrator and victim and, more generally, in relation to laws motivated by a desire to secure women’s human rights.     

State Livelihood Planning and Legibility in Vietnam’s Northern Borderlands: The “Rightful Criticisms” of Local Officials

Macro-level policies frequently transform and reconfigure local livelihood options. While there is a small but growing body of ethnographic work regarding ethnic minority livelihoods in Vietnam’s mountainous borderlands, there is far less research examining the state decrees and policies implemented there and the opinions of state workers who have to apply them. This article starts to address this gap. First, we examine contemporary Vietnamese state legislation regarding upland livelihoods. We focus on the directions found in 82 livelihood-related state decrees, examining their scope and edicts while critiquing what they overlook regarding upland livelihood needs and approaches. Then, from in-depth interviews with state officials in Hà Giang Province, a mountainous upland region with a proportionately large ethnic minority population, we explore the opinions of those charged with the implementation of these decrees. Building on O’Brien’s earlier work on rightful resistance in China, we suggest that a form of “rightful criticism” has emerged among upland state officials, allowing us to reveal the contours of political power in Vietnam’s borderlands. Moreover, we draw attention to the lack of acknowledgement of ethnic diversity in these uplands within policy and official practice.     

Der Internationale Gerichtshof als Verfassungsgericht und Verfassungsvergleicher. Wähnen, Wunsch und Wirklichkeit

Der IGH fügt sich nicht ohne Weiteres in den Reigen der Verfassungsgerichte ein. Deshalb ist es hier nicht wie bei nationalen Verfassungsgerichten und mittlerweile wohl auch bei EuGH und EGMR möglich, direct zur Tagesordnung der Analyse der Verfassungsrechtsprechung und der Praxis der Verfassungsvergleichung überzugehen. Vielmehr ist vorab zu klären, ob der IGH überhaupt in einem mehr als metaphorischen Sinne als Verfassungsgericht angesprochen werden kann. Dies verlangt zunächst die Beantwortung der Frage, ob und inwieweit es "Verfassung" im Völkerrecht gibt. Bejahendenfalls ist zu untersuchen, in welchem Sinne der IGH diesbezüglich als Verfassungsgericht agiert. Die Existenz einer Völkerrechtsverfassung ist nämlich notwendige, aber nicht hinreichende Bedingung für die Etablierung des IGH als Verfassungsgericht. Der vorliegende Beitrag sucht diese Klärungen in mehreren Schritten herbeizuführen. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der IGH gewisse typische verfassungsgerichtliche Funktionen erfüllt. Ob damit die kritische Masse zur Adelung als Verfassungsgericht erreicht wird, ist zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt jedoch zu bezweifeln.