The Israeli Patient's Rights Law: evidence for deprofessionalization?

In this paper, the Israeli Patient's Rights Law of 1996 is discussed within the framework of Haug's predicted process of deprofessionalization. It is argued that the law reflects global processes such as the diffusion of knowledge, consumerism, and values that emphasize human rights and democracy. By guaranteeing patients' access to medical information, by submitting medical decisions to extra-professional regulation, the law erodes professional power.     

Sanchez v. Fairview Developmental Center: findings of fact and conclusions of law denying preliminary injunction. (No. CV 88-0129 FFF (Tx), 30 Mar 1988)

Jesus Sanchez is a profoundly retarded patient in a semicomatose state in California's Fairview Developmental Center. His parents requested that the Center remove his gastrostomy tube. Fairview refused the request because it contradicted state hospital policies. Claiming that the refusal violated Jesus's right of privacy, his parents sought to have a federal court interpret the Constitution in a manner requiring California to allow for unilateral termination of their son's life. The parents moved for a preliminary injunction compelling Fairview to honor their request. The Court refused to find that the Constitution provided a mandate to terminate life-sustaining treatment. The Court said that Jesus could be moved from Fairview to a private facility that would carry out the request, but declined to issue the injunction because the parents failed to demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits or that irreparable harm would accrue if the injunction were not ordered.     

Bouvia v. County of Riverside

The plaintiff, a quadriplegic with cerebral palsy, had admitted herself voluntarily to the psychiatric department of Riverside General Hospital in September 1983. She then revealed her intention of starving herself to death, requested that hospital personnel administer only pain medication and hygienic care, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the hospital from either force feeding, transferring, or discharging her. The essence of her legal claim was that society was obliged to honor, and to assist her in carrying out, her privacy right to end her life. While the Superior Court recognized a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining care under some circumstances, it ruled that because Bouvia's condition was not terminal, her rights must yield to the interests of the state and other third parties in preserving life.