The limits of deregulation: Transnational interpenetration and policy change

Abstract. Deregulation became a major cross-national trend in the 1980s. Proponents of deregulation have included neoclassicists, pragmatists and certain analysts on the Left and Center-Left. Deregulation has a number of unintended or unforeseen consequences. A major issue is the development of new, market-oriented regulations and regulatory structures – the first category of 'reregulation'. Another is the cross-national knock-on effect of regulatory changes. And a third is the emergence of new forms of market stabilization and control, whether by the state or at the transnational level. A crucial feature of deregulation is the change in the wider pattern of state intervention from the 'welfare state' model to that of the 'competition state'. A number of competing explanations for deregulation can be identified – market explanations, institutional/technological explanations and political explanations – each of which has significant variants. These explanations can be seen to apply in the real world at four different levels: the 'global' level; that of various intermediary transnational political structures; the state level; and the level of 'self-regulation' of a neo-corporatist kind.     

Panel data analysis in comparative politics: Linking method to theory

Abstract.  Re-analyzing a study of Garrett and Mitchell ('Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD', European Journal of Political Research 39(2) (2001): 145–177), this article addresses four potential sources of problems in panel data analyses with a lagged dependent variable and period and unit dummies (the de facto Beck-Katz standard). These are: absorption of cross-sectional variance by unit dummies, absorption of time-series variance by the lagged dependent variable and period dummies, mis-specification of the lag structure, and neglect of parameter slope heterogeneity. Based on this discussion, we suggest substantial changes of the estimation approach and the estimated model. Employing our preferred methodological stance, we demonstrate that Garrett and Mitchell's findings are not robust. Instead, we show that partisan politics and socioeconomic factors such as aging and unemployment as expected by theorists have a strong impact on the time-series and cross-sectional variance in government spending.