The Options for Devolution Finance: The Choices for the New Government

The debate about the financing of devolved government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has acquired a new vigour since 2007, with commissions and reviews taking place in Scotland, Wales and at Westminster. Although of considerable constitutional as well as political importance, the technical detail has obscured many of the wider issues involved. This paper surveys the options now open to the UK government, as it prepares its response to the Welsh Holtham Commission, a bill implementing the Calman Commission's recommendations for Scotland, and looks at ways of altering corporation tax in Northern Ireland. It examines six options that in principle are open to the UK government, and argues that the range of options open to the UK government are narrower than they often appear, and that pressure for it to act is such that it will no longer be possible to avoid far‐reaching action.     

The National Interest and the Politics of Threat Exaggeration: The Blair Government's Case for War against Iraq

During the 2005 General Election the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, suggested that the invasion of Iraq was in 'the national interest'. Whether he knew it or not, this phrase has often referred to controversial decisions taken by governments, away from scrutiny and subject to criticism when made public, but which they believe are in the best interests of the British state.
The article summarises the consequences of the invasion in terms of the subsequent criticism and official inquiries before addressing the question of what is the national interest. The article then considers what exactly was the threat, and whether or not it was exaggerated, and what evidence is now emerging to indicate that the decision to invade was taken 'in the national interest'. It concludes that there was a decision to support the USA and that the threat was exaggerated to justify this decision.     

Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002

Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party‐political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self‐restraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.