Berlusconi,Boehner and the Brink: Lessons for Political Reform in Britain

In the early autumn of 2013 large minorities in Italy and the United States fermented crises that badly disrupted the government of the two countries. These cases were widely understood as instances of dysfunction in established democracies that would rarely be replicated elsewhere. However, while all the conditions that generated the crises are unlikely to be evident in other established democracies three important factors that caused the disruptions in the American and Italian political processes are also sources of political conflict in Britain. They are the powers of the second legislative chamber, the weakening links between parties and social groups, and the redrawing of electoral boundaries. All of them present problems for political reform in Britain, and understanding the role they played in the two political crises of 2013 is important for future reform in Britain.     

EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PERCEPTIONS OF RED TAPE: A PROFESSIONALISM‐MARKETIZATION MODEL

In the public administration literature, ways in which perceptions of red tape vary between different parts of the public sector remains relatively unexplored. In this article we define organizational red tape as a subject‐dependent concept; that is, we expect to see variations in the level and type of red tape between different internal stakeholder groups. We then explain variations with two organizational‐based variables, professionalization and marketization. The empirical analysis is undertaken on nearly 800 English local government services. The framework correctly predicts that officials in highly professionalized and marketized services perceive higher levels of red tape, while those in less professionalized and marketized services report lower levels. We then summarize our findings and comment on their theoretical and practical significance.