Pennsylvania's New Limit On Asbestos Liability For Successor Corporations

Pennsylvania recently enacted a law that limits the damages a successor corporation can be required to pay for asbestos liabilities. Senate Bill 216, which the Pennsylvania legislature passed in December 2001, bars any recovery against a qualifying successor corporation in excess of the adjusted fair market value of its predecessor. The act applies to all successor corporations that were incorporated in Pennsylvania prior to May 1, 2001 and that consummated a merger or consolidation with their predecessor prior to that date. Under standard choice-of-law rules, the act should protect qualifying successor corporations in many jurisdictions outside of Pennsylvania. The act survived its first constitutional challenge at the trial court level, and should survive any future challenges in the appellate courts     

FROM PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: REASSESSING A REVOLUTION?

Changes to the study of public administration tend to follow those in the practice of the administration of government. The recent shift to public management is characterized and assessed both as a practice and a field of study. The result has been less a revolution in paradigm than the emergence of a vision of government which competes with but does not supplant traditional public administration.     

The Professionalization of Public Accounting: A Social Dilemma Perspective

This study uses a social dilemma model of auditing and a model of cooperative regulatory enforcement to provide a framework within which the evolution of self-regulation in the U.S. accounting profession is studied. From a social dilemma perspective, individual public accounting firms are best off, in a single period sense, by providing a low quality audit product, which is defined in terms of the degree of auditor acquiescence to managers' accounting method discretion. However, firms' collective welfare is maximized by high quality auditing. The cooperative regulatory model employed is premised on the existence of a plausible government threat of punishments and invasive regulations, which motivates self-regulation in an industry. We argue that prior to enactment of the securities acts, public accounting firms faced a social dilemma in which there were limited incentives for high quality auditing either voluntarily or through the establishment of self-regulation. The securities acts provided a plausible threat to which the accounting industry responded by implementing self-regulation in order to avoid invasive and costly government regulation. After the emergence of the accounting profession, there occurred a long period of cooperative regulation with the SEC. Management discretion over accounting methods increased during this time period and audit quality correspondingly decreased, suggesting possible inefficient capture of the SEC. Evidence of an evolution towards a tripartite form of regulation appeared in the 1970s when the SEC and public accounting began to be critically reviewed by Congress. From this time to the present, new regulatory threats have motivated a series of self-regulatory responses by public accounting to improve audit quality.