What Ministers Do

Having been a minister in three different departments for a period of over nine years (1999–2008), during the Blair and, briefly, the Brown governments, I thought it might be useful to reflect on what ministers actually do, their functions and how they spend their days. In thinking about what I did as a minister, I have avoided going back to some of the classic constitutional texts on what ministers supposedly do, how they are accountable and such like. I am sure there is good literature on this from political scientists and constitutionalists, but I have avoided influencing my own views and approach by consulting these texts.     

TIME AGGREGATION AND TIME LAG IN MACRO-LEVEL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Recent arguments in research on individual-level deterrence suggest that the effect of perceived sanction risk on illegal behavior might occur over a shorter time period than the yearly lags typically incorporated in panel studies. This study raises the same issue for macro-level deterrence research by suggesting that panel studies using yearly data might have failed to capture the deterrent effect. The analysis uses ARIMA models with data aggregated monthly, quarterly, and semiannually to estimate the reciprocal effects between arrests and crimes for robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft in Oklahoma City from 1967 through 1989. No effect of crimes on arrests is found, but significant effects of arrests on crimes appear for three of the four offenses in the shorter temporal aggregations. The results suggest a need to reconsider conclusions based on panel studies that have used time aggregations and time lags that might be too long to uncover deterrent effects.     

ANALYZING OFFICIAL DEVIANCE

Partisan criminological analysis is characterized by dogmatic theories whose volidity is politically rather thon scientifically determined. Methods of inquiry ore used to demonstrate rather thon test theoretical propositions. Standard methodological tactics include assertion, anecdote, association, and analogy. In contrast, nonpartisan conflict analysis treats as entirely problematic the processes by which conceptions of deviance are socially constructed and become the official concerns of those who wield state power. What, how, why, and by whom behavioral or nonbehovioral attributes are labeled deviant is viewed as o function of the relative power of parties in conflict over the distribution of life chances.     

Models of Clientelism and Policy Change: The Case of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Mexico and Brazil

Clientelist systems vary, and this variation influences the adoption and evolution of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes. We find that vertically integrated, corporatist clientelism in Mexico and more locally oriented, bossist clientelism in Brazil differentially shape the choices of governments to turn piecemeal, discretionary CCTs into more expansive and secure benefits.