Identification of Risk Factors Generating Terrorism in Pakistan

Terrorism is a complex issue and various researchers have identified numerous causes and conditions that generate or are capable of generating terrorism. In the last decade, terrorist attacks claimed 36,495 lives and injured 27,985 people in Pakistan as a result of 3,482 bomb blasts and 281 suicide attacks. The aim of this research was to establish the major risk factors generating terrorism, based on the opinions of security officials who dealt directly with the Pakistan security situation. Sixty-five causes identified from the literature and interviews with security officials were modeled and transformed into a questionnaire. A nationwide response from security officials who were directly involved in dealing with apprehended terrorists was obtained. The population was selected proportionately from high, medium, and low security zones of Pakistan. Out of 500 questionnaires sent, 103 valid responses were received. The results helped establish the 13 major risk factors associated with generating terrorism. It was observed that addressing these 13 major risk factors would mostly resolve the other minor risk factors as well. Findings of this research might be beneficial for countries affected by terrorism, and countries with prioritized and rationalized allocation of funds in their budgets for substantially overcoming terrorism.     

OUTLINING LONG-TERM GOALS

<正>China is creating a road to a new world By Sajjad MalikChinese President Xi Jinping,in his key address at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,elaborated on and explained the endless possibilities offered by his vision for win-win cooperation,which is laid out in the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road(Belt and Road)Initiative.     

Repression,co-optation and insurgency: Pakistan’s FATA,Southern Thailand and Papua,Indonesia

Scholars have long identified state repression as playing a key role in the onset of insurgency. Violence by security forces increases anger against the state and assists with rebel recruitment. Yet scholars have also recognised that repression does not always lead to rebellion: in some cases it successfully quashes movements before they have begun. This study advances an argument for when and why repression leads to insurgency and sometimes does not. We contend that violence by state security forces can fail to trigger rebellion if local elites within the repressed community are simultaneously co-opted with political and economic opportunities. When elites are satisfied with local autonomy and patronage they deprive the dissident movement of local leadership and coordination. When the state uses repression against a community and at the same time abandons this mutually beneficial relationship, the insurgency has both the leadership and grassroots support it requires. We illustrate our argument by examining three cases of state violence in Asia. In two of our cases, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Southern Thailand, repression led directly to insurgency. In the third, Papua in Indonesia, ongoing co-optation of local elites has left the movement factionalised and weak.     

Devolution Plan 2000: dictatorship,democracy, and the politics of institutional change in Pakistan

Contemporary development theory and policy research puts an overarching emphasis on institution building as a key driver of change in developing countries. Over the past few decades, decentralisation reforms have played out as the linchpin of such institution building efforts, advocated by international development agencies and favoured by national governments. This article examines decentralisation reforms implemented in Pakistan under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers initiative through a case study of the implementation and outcomes of Devolution Plan (DP) in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province. Promulgated by General Musharaf in 2000, the DP aimed to restructure and rebuild political and administrative structures, to redress key issues of governance, resource distribution, and service delivery. The Local Government System (LGS) was a key reform element within the DP, but it lost traction and was abolished in 2008/09. This article demonstrates two important factors, regime legitimisation and the preservation of clientelistic politics, that have profoundly shaped implementation of the DP. The findings demonstrate how the implementation of this large-scale internationally supported attempt at institution building ultimately succumbed to a range of particularistic interests.     

The human right to marry: a refugee’s perspective

In the European Court of Human Rights cases of Muñoz Díaz v Spain in 2009 (Muñoz Díaz v Spain [2009], Application No. 49151/07) and Serife Yigit v Turkey in 2010 (Serife Yegit [2010], Application No. 3976/05), involving unregistered/informal ‘marriages’ of a Roma couple and a Muslim couple, respectively, the Grand Chamber took the position that civil marriages are available to all people in the state without distinction and therefore no breach of Article 12’s right to marry (nor Article 14’s prohibition of discrimination) had occurred when the respective states failed to recognise the informal marriages of the applicants. This article considers these two cases, and asks whether the court’s position is challenged by migrants/refugees, whose access to formal marriages maybe impeded due to a lack of identity and status documentation.     

Macroeconomic Policies and Agricultural Terms of Trade,Bangladesh, 1952–2005

Agricultural prices in Bangladesh have had a tendency to rise at a faster rate than industrial prices since the early 1950s. The resulting rising trend in the agricultural terms of trade has been pronounced since the mid-1980s when Bangladesh introduced IMF- and World Bank-supported deregulatory economic reforms. This rising trend in the agricultural terms of trade is inconsistent with the Prebisch-Singer thesis in the context of domestic economy, which suggests a secular deterioration in the terms of trade for primary products vis-à-vis manufactured products. It is, however, consistent with the view of classical economists who saw the possibility of an upward trend in the terms of trade for agricultural products (food) because of diminishing returns in agriculture. In fact, the classical idea of the rising terms of trade for primary products makes sense in a land-constrained growing economy with increasing population, such as Bangladesh, which remained semi-closed until the mid-1980s. This article reviews macroeconomic policies in Bangladesh since the 1950s, examines the time-series properties of agricultural prices, industrial prices and the agricultural terms of trade and draws inference on the issue whether the agricultural sector was squeezed systematically by turning the terms of trade against agriculture for industrialisation of the country.     

Dreams of a Secular Republic: Elite Alienation in Post-Zia Pakistan

Since the onset of the “war on terror,” an apparently irreconcilable “secular-religious” divide has come to the fore in Pakistani society with ostensibly deep historical roots. In this article the “divide” is critically interrogated through an historical-sociological analysis, including detailed interviews with a small sample of both “secularists” and leftists who do not subscribe to the “secular-religious” binary. The article emphasises that substantive social changes have taken place over the past four decades, coeval with the erosion of a relatively insular structure of power dominated by the secular, Westernised successors to the British. The concomitant rise of a “nativised” middle class has both been cause and consequence of the old elite’s steady retreat into its private ghettoes. The latter’s growing alienation from wider society – including the realm of formal politics – has been accompanied by growing alarmism about the increasingly illiberal and hyper-religious character of the mass of the population. Elite alienation has intensified since 2001, making the “secular-religious” divide a self-fulfilling prophecy. Notwithstanding its protestations, however, the elite remains the major beneficiary of the prevailing structure of power, and a meaningful transformative politics – both secular and responsive to the material deprivations of ordinary people – remains conspicuously absent.