Measuring Delegation

Principal-agent analyses of delegation to international organizations have advanced our understanding of international cooperation through institutions. However, broader tests of why and when states delegate are not possible without a clear means for objectively identifying and measuring delegation. This paper develops a metric for delegation based upon the services the agent provides to its principals and the resources and autonomy it has to provide those services. This numerical metric is continuous and generalizable to a wide variety of principal-agent relationships. This paper then demonstrates the face validity of the measure with case studies of delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper concludes with a test of Realist and Institutionalist hypotheses for cooperation using the delegation metric, demonstrating the complexity of the underlying reasons we observe delegation.     

Enforcing international environmental cooperation: Technological standards can help

Market instruments, such as emissions trading or pollution taxes, are less costly than “command and control” regulation. Yet technological standards are common in international environmental agreements and now figure prominently among proposals to mitigate global warming. I show that technological standards can be combined with market instruments to create collective enforcement power. They allow states to internationally enforce technology installation, so the payoff to free riding decreases. A notable feature of the argument is that technological standards and market instruments are complements, while previous research has treated them as substitutes. Empirically, technological standards are most valuable if international cooperation is difficult to enforce and the rate of technological change in concerned industries is slow.     

The Baltic as a shipping and information area: the role of Amsterdam in Baltic integration in early modern Europe

In early modern times, the Netherlands imported grain from the Baltic, especially Poland, and re-exported it elsewhere in Europe. The Dutch shipping industry was extremely profitable, for transport costs were very high, and the number of Dutch ships was by far the largest among the European countries. Dutch prosperity was based on shipping of grain from the Baltic. Amsterdam was also a center of information because it was a port at which many ships stayed, and which attracted various merchants owing to its policy of religious tolerance. Much commercial information and know-how were accumulated in and spread from Amsterdam which contributed to the growth of the regional European economy from the Baltic because many merchants migrated to Northern Europe via the city, bringing with them the latest commercial techniques. Amsterdam therefore served as a core of Baltic integration in the early modern period, for it was a center of shipping and information.     

Strengthening the Legitimacy of Representative Democracy: Public Participation,Bipartisan Floor Bills and Plenary Deliberations in the Japanese Diet

It is argued that parliamentary legislation in Japan has become the almost exclusive playing field of the bureaucracy, who acts on behalf of the executive, and party councils. Moreover bureaucrats bypass the legislative Diet process by making rules themselves. This is problematic because it is the lawmakers who are directly held accountable by voters for the enacted legislation risking to be eventually voted out of office. It is suggested that under the given circumstances of strict party discipline, drafting of bills by the bureaucracy and endorsement by party councils, the formal majority rule alone is not sufficient to justify legislative outcomes. The legitimacy factor is introduced to verify in how far individual lawmakers are enabled to initiate and draft floor bills by themselves, discuss bill contents in plenary deliberations and get the public opinion involved. The article attempts to demonstrate that bipartisan floor bills reflect the quest for parliamentary legitimacy and equality among lawmakers across party boundaries. It is suggested that the more legislators participate in drafting and discussing a bill the more legitimate the outcome becomes. The paper screens to this effect several bipartisan bills submitted to the Diet of Japan. Bills such as the NPO law, the law to ratify the Rome Statute for the accession to the ICC, the law to prevent suicide and the law to implement internet filters to protect children are the result of cooperation among lawmakers trying to constrain the interference of the executive or of the powerful bureaucracy. The participation of non-parliamentary agents taking an active part in the legislative process has enhanced the dynamics of representative democracy as well. In the decades of radical ideological confrontation in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s the majority rule risked to become an instrument of coercion. The opposition was compelled to resort to anti-parliamentary obstructionist tactics to derail majority legislation that was rammed through parliament without sufficient plenary deliberation and without taking into account the concerns or viewpoints of the minority. Obstructionism decreased with the LDP co-optation of opposition parties to government responsibility in the 1990s. Opposition for the sake of opposition (communists, DPJ until 2006) and governing for the sake of governing (SDPJ, Komei) have not been honored by the voters. After 2007 the DPJ started to refocus its policies more on ideological differentiation and managed to beat the LDP in the 2009 elections. Recently the work of the Diet has been increasingly put under the scrutiny of international NGOs and legislatures abroad. The unresolved controversial comfort women issue suggests that omission to pass appropriate and timely reconciliatory legislation can cause a serious loss of parliamentary institutional esteem and respect.     

Intra-European Bargaining and the ‘Tower of Babel’ EU Approach to the Burmese Conundrum

Since the 1990 imposition of an arms embargo, the European Union has kept on furthering its sanction policies towards Burma’s military regime in response to its poor record on human rights and authoritarian rule over the country. However, more than a decade after the 1996 EU Common Position on Burma, the European approach to the Burmese conundrum has still failed to achieve its initial objective of facilitating a transition to democracy and of stimulating aid and development in the country. This article seeks to underline the limits of the EU position by highlighting the internal and external obstacles the Europeans have been facing in their policymaking process towards Burma. It is argued that the varied and multiple interests of the 27 EU members; an influential European public opinion favouring an attitude of ostracism; and misunderstandings or miscalculations in appreciating the current state of Burmese affairs have hindered the EU from playing an efficacious role. Moreover these factors also impede its reappraisal.     

The effects of treaty legality and domestic institutional hurdles on environmental treaty ratification

We study the effects of treaty design and domestic institutional hurdles on the ratification behavior of states with respect to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Specifically, we examine whether (1) strong legality mandated by a treaty such as precisely stated obligations, strong monitoring/enforcement mechanisms, and dispute resolution procedures, and (2) high domestic constitutional hurdles such as requirements for explicit legislative approval deter countries from ratifying a treaty. To test our theoretical claim, we use a new time-series-cross-sectional dataset that includes information on the ratification behavior of 162 countries with respect to 220 MEAs in 1950–2000. We find that treaties that are characterized as ‘hard’ indeed deter ratification. Furthermore, explicit legislative approval requiring supermajority also makes treaty ratification less likely.     

Promoting Muslims’ Willingness to Report Terror Threats to Police: Testing Competing Theories of Procedural Justice

The heightened threat of terrorism in the West has resulted in more power being granted to police. However, new anti-terror laws and heavy-handed policing practices can stigmatize Muslim communities. Using survey data from 800 Australian Muslims this paper examines whether procedural justice policing in counter-terrorism enhances Muslims’ feelings of social inclusion, and promotes their intentions to report terror threats to police. Of interest is how procedural justice influences Muslims who feel less socially included. Three competing theoretical frameworks differ in the predictions they make about when and why procedural justice influences excluded groups. This paper considers each framework and discusses how each explains the relationships between our variables of interest. Our findings show that procedural justice is positively associated with social inclusion and intentions to report terror threats to police. Findings also show that social inclusion both moderates and partially mediates the effect of procedural justice on reporting intentions.