What does “knock and announce” mean? An analysis of<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wilson v. Arkansas</Emphasis> and its progeny

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Arkansas (1994) that the common law “knock-and-announce” principle formed part of the “reasonableness” inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court’s opinion gave little guidance as to what would be unreasonable under these circumstances. Some critics expressed concern that this lack of guidance would lead to many variations among lower courts. Other observers discerned a signal that little should be deemed “unreasonable” in the context of “knock and announce.” These criticisms are analyzed through a review of lower court interpretations of Wilson.     

Perceived fairness of drug-testing policies: An application of Leventhal’s principles of procedural justice

Employees rate the fairness of organizational policies by applying principles of distributive and procedural justice. Using Leventhal’s (1980) Principles of Procedural Justice, the current study surveyed 279 upper-level college and graduate students to determine the impact each principle has on support for drugtesting policies. The results support the hypothesis that drug-testing programs that violate these principles are viewed as unfair.     

Author Index volume 35 (2002)

Authors Index

Author Index volume 35 (2002)     

STR data for the AmpFlSTR Profiler Plus loci from Greece

Allele frequencies for the nine STRs included in the AmpFlSTR Profiler Plus kit (D3S1358, VWA, FGA, D8S1179, D21S11, D18S51, D5S818, D13S317 and D7S820) were estimated from a sample of 143 unrelated individuals living in different regions of Greece.     

Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures

Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policymaking with evidence from Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Majority leaders in the Argentine and Chilean lower chambers have successfully blocked passage of legislation opposed by most of their fellow partisans despite the lack of codified gatekeeping rights. Since 1997, none of the major Mexican parties has benefited from the gatekeeping rights established in the rules. Instead, the benefits have come from the parties' advantageous position with respect to the other parties on the steering committee setting the plenary agenda.