Do the illegal and legal rents of politicians affect municipal election outcomes? Empirical evidence

This paper aims to analyse whether illegal (corruption) and legal rent extraction (high politicians’ wages) affect electoral outcomes at municipal level. We use an initial sample of 145 Spanish municipalities over 50,000 for two electoral periods: 2004–2007 (before the crisis) and 2008–2011 (during the crisis). Our findings show that neither illegal nor legal rent extraction impact on re-election in non-crisis times. However, we observe that citizens penalize legal rent extraction in the ballots during the crisis. Regarding the economic performance of the local governments, we find that its effect on re-election is important in non-crisis period. Nevertheless, in time of crisis, given that the economic situation is bad in general in the country, voters pay less attention to economic factors and focus on politicians’ behaviour.     

Evaluating local government performance in times of crisis

In recent years, Spanish local governments have come under increasing pressure to accommodate severe economic restrictions while maintaining their provision of local public services. We analyse overall cost efficiency in Spanish local governments during the period of the economic crisis (2008–2013), under four different non-parametric methodologies. Moreover, given how problematic it is to precisely define what municipalities do, we compare three different output models with various measures of quantity as well as quality. Results suggest that Spanish local government efficiency improved over the period 2008–2013 since budget expenditures (inputs) fell while local public services and facilities (outputs) were maintained. We also find evidence of the possible implications of service quality when measuring municipalities’ efficiency, and of structural differences in the average efficiency between municipalities located in different Spanish regions. Finally, our results confirm that the level and variation of efficiency scores are affected by the approach taken.     

A Profile of Violent Offenders in Spanish Prisons

In Europe, it is relatively uncommon to find studies that investigate the criminal profiles of violent offenders, especially infrequent are those that pay special attention to offenders’ mental health/substance use disorders and histories of violence during childhood. The current research explores whether inmates who are incarcerated for violent offenses (n = 536) in Spain are different in terms of the aforementioned factors as compared to inmates incarcerated for non-violent offenses (n = 536). Multivariate logistic regression analysis revealed that violent offenders, as compared to their non-violent counterparts, were more likely to be younger, younger at the time of their first arrest, single, use alcohol, receive treatment in prison for anxiety or schizophrenia, and report physical abuse during childhood.     

Liberal Democracy Series I, 1972–1988: Definition, measurement, and trajectories

The purpose of this paper is to provide the definitional and empirical background to the Liberal Democracy Series I Index of democracy that is available in Bollen (1998) but whose rationale has not been published. More specifically, the paper (1) gives a definition of liberal democracy that has guided the formation of this index, (2) describes measures that correspond to this definition, (3) provides a measurement model that links the indicators of democracy to the latent variables that represent the concept, (4) explains the construction of the Liberal Democracy Series I Index, and (5) compares the Series I democracy measure to two other widely used democracy measures in a latent curve model. The Liberal Democracy Series I Index provides a simple unweighted measure of liberal democracy that minimizes the bias in expert ratings, is highly reliable and highly correlated with the latent liberal democracy variable. The evidenced reviewed here suggests that its measurement properties are superior to the Polity and Vanhanen democracy indices with the exception that it is available for a more limited period of years than these latter two.     

Negotiating the EU–U.S. Open Aviation Area Agreement 2007 in the Context of Transatlantic Airline Regimes Since 1944

Between 1944 and 2002, the United States sought to create a competitive and commercially driven international civil aviation regime. It tried to peel away politically inspired regulations, which fragmented the marketplace, and deliver efficiencies and consumer benefits. In contrast with the American liberal tradition—albeit with limitations—the industry in Europe was over-regulated and largely based on subsidised state-owned carriers with international market quotas. Thus for many years Europe and the U.S. followed different paths; but political and economic dynamics conspired together in the 1980s and early 1990s to produce remarkable change in the European Community and, by 1997, there were the makings of a competitive and lightly regulated single market, which brought it close to U.S. practice. Since 2002, the United States has been less liberal in its airline policies; the EU has been more liberal. It would be an irony indeed if the great regime liberaliser since 1944 were now to become a force of regulatory conservatism that denied consummation to the vision of a transatlantic open aviation area that could be a magnet to draw in the rest of the world into a truly global commercial airline market.