Less Government, More Secrecy: Reinvention and the Weakening of Freedom of Information Law

Many critics have suggested that worldwide efforts to reinvent government could also weaken democratic control over public institutions, but few have considered how attempts to implement the "new paradigm" in public management might affect a widely used instrument for promoting accountability: freedom of information law (FOI). FOI laws give citizens and nongovernmental organizations the right of access to government information. However, recent Canadian experience shows that reinvention can weaken FOI laws in three ways. First, attempts to reduce "nonessential" spending may cause delays in handling FOI requests and weaken mechanisms for ensuring compliance. Second, governmental functions may be transferred to private contractors and not-for-profit organizations that are not required to comply with FOI laws. Third, governments' attempts to sell information and increase FOI fees may create new economic barriers to openness. Thus, restructuring provides an opportunity for political executives, public servants, and some well-organized business interests to weaken oversight mechanisms and increase their own autonomy within the policy process.     

A smorgasbord of agricultural technologies: farmers' choices and lessons from Chalite,Panama

Patronato de Nutrición introduced a range of 18 optional agricultural technologies in the indigenous community of Chalite, Panama. Three of the technologies were adopted by more than half of the farmers surveyed, while an additional eight technologies were adopted by between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of the farmers. Farmers were more likely to adopt technologies associated with familiar crops, previously promoted by other groups, or requiring limited labour or financial resources. The article shows how development groups can quickly reduce the number of technologies promoted in order to deliver services more effectively.     

The Path Not Taken: Leonard White and the Macrodynamics of Administrative Development

Leonard White , The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History ( New York: Macmillan , 1948).
Leonard White , The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829 ( New York: Macmillan , 1951).
Leonard White , The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–1861 ( New York: Macmillan , 1954).
Leonard White , The Republican Era, 1869–1901: A Study in Administrative History ( New York, Macmillan , 1958).
This is a review of four books by Leonard White: The Federalists (1948), The Jeffersonians (1951), The Jacksonians (1954), and The Republican Era (1958). In these books, White develops an approach to the study of administrative development that accounts for a broad range of considerations, including political and economic structure, the organization of the international order, popular culture, the stock of available communication and organizational technologies, and executive talent. White also offers an early argument about the significance of path dependence in institutional evolution. White's approach is largely concerned with the macrodynamics of administrative development. It has been neglected within the field of public administration over the last half century. A literature that builds on White's work would improve the field's ability to explain and anticipate failures in state building and administrative reform.     

UK policy coordination during the 1990-91 intergovernmental conference

Despite the importance of European Union negotiations, the majority of scholarly attention has not been directed towards the means by which policy is coordinated in member states. This article addresses one aspect of this gap by focusing upon the structures which existed for UK policy making during the 1990-91 IGC negotiations. Particular emphasis is attached to the key role of officials, who often proved crucial to the extraction of compromises at the European level, and the manner by which policy was constrained by the inability of the Prime Minister to dominate Cabinet.