Suicide with multiple graze shots

A 77-year-old man was found in his flat with a shot to the right temple. In spite of hospital treatment he died from the head injury the next day. The weapon at the scene used for committing the suicide was a pistol, make Kaba Special (calibre 6.35 mm). At autopsy, the right temporal region showed a surgically treated, originally stellate gunshot entrance wound with a powder cavity. Close to this penetrating gunshot wound there were 3 parallel graze shot injuries of the scalp. The autopsy findings were consistent with the assumption that all the shots had been fired by the victim himself with suicidal intent. The injury pattern is presented and discussed in relation to the results of the technical investigation of the weapon and the findings at the scene.     

The role of moral disengagement in the execution process

The present study tested the proposition that disengagement of moral self-sanctions enables prison personnel to carry out the death penalty. Three subgroups of personnel in penitentiaries located in three Southern states were assessed in terms of eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. The personnel included the execution teams that carry out the executions; the support teams that provide solace and emotional support to the families of the victims and the condemned inmate; and prison guards who have no involvement in the execution process. The executioners exhibited the highest level of moral, social, and economic justifications, disavowal of personal responsibility, and dehumanization. The support teams that provide the more humane services disavowed moral disengagement, as did the noninvolved guards but to a lesser degree than the support teams.     

Successor Liability and Asymmetric Information

The doctrine of successor liability transfers tort liabilityarising from the seller's past conduct from the seller to thebuyer. If the buyer has as much information about the liabilityas the seller, all beneficial acquisitions take place and theseller takes the efficient level of precaution. However, ifthe seller has more information about the liability than thebuyer, not all beneficial acquisitions are consummated and theseller takes a suboptimal level of precaution. I argue that,in the presence of information asymmetry, the courts shouldincrease the damages against the (potential) seller to providebetter incentives to take precaution while decreasing the damagesagainst the buyer to encourage more beneficial asset sales.     

The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.