The role of moral disengagement in the execution process

The present study tested the proposition that disengagement of moral self-sanctions enables prison personnel to carry out the death penalty. Three subgroups of personnel in penitentiaries located in three Southern states were assessed in terms of eight mechanisms of moral disengagement. The personnel included the execution teams that carry out the executions; the support teams that provide solace and emotional support to the families of the victims and the condemned inmate; and prison guards who have no involvement in the execution process. The executioners exhibited the highest level of moral, social, and economic justifications, disavowal of personal responsibility, and dehumanization. The support teams that provide the more humane services disavowed moral disengagement, as did the noninvolved guards but to a lesser degree than the support teams.     

Patent Related Indicators for Assessing Knowledge-Generating Institutions: Towards a Contextualised Approach

This contribution aims at examining the extent to which patent related indicators are relevant for shedding light on the notion of excellence within knowledge-generating institutions. Traditionally, excellence has been looked upon as the ability to create interesting and valuable new scientific concepts, theories and data. From such a perspective, scientific excellence can be assessed through scientometric measures of publication output and impact. The recent interest in the entrepreneurial phenomenon within knowledge-generating institutes justifies efforts to examine the relevancy of broadening the set of indicators used to assess such institutions into the direction of entrepreneurial excellence. In this paper we will examine the relevancy of using patent data in order to delineate such additional, more entrepreneurial oriented, indicators. The arguments and findings presented in this respect will lead us to a plea for the use of these indicators in a contextualized manner.     

Successor Liability and Asymmetric Information

The doctrine of successor liability transfers tort liabilityarising from the seller's past conduct from the seller to thebuyer. If the buyer has as much information about the liabilityas the seller, all beneficial acquisitions take place and theseller takes the efficient level of precaution. However, ifthe seller has more information about the liability than thebuyer, not all beneficial acquisitions are consummated and theseller takes a suboptimal level of precaution. I argue that,in the presence of information asymmetry, the courts shouldincrease the damages against the (potential) seller to providebetter incentives to take precaution while decreasing the damagesagainst the buyer to encourage more beneficial asset sales.