Toxicologic studies in a fatal overdose of 2,4-D, mecoprop, and dicamba

A suicidal poisoning committed by a 61-year-old woman, who ingested an unknown quantity of Killex, containing in aqueous solution 100 g/L of (2,4-dichlorophenox)acetic acid (2,4-D), 50 g/L of mecoprop, and 9 g/L of dicamba as amine salts is described. Quantitation of chlorophenoxy acids was performed by extraction from an acidified mixture and concentration before high performance liquid chromatography analysis. All three herbicides were separated in a phosphate buffer/acetonitrile mixture at 280 nm on a RP-8 column. Concentrations of herbicides found were: in blood--520-mg/L 2,4-D, 530-mg/L mecoprop, and 170-mg/L dicamba; in urine--670-mg/L 2,4-D and 520-mg/L mecoprop; in bile--340-mg/L 2,4-D, 530-mg/L mecoprop, and 140-mg/L dicamba; and in liver--540-mg/Kg 2,4-D, 500-mg/Kg mecoprop, and less than 100-mg/Kg dicamba. Liquid chromatography was found to be a reliable method for herbicide quantitation in biological tissues and fluids. The technique offered definite advantages over ultraviolet spectrophotometry and avoids the derivatization requirement for gas chromatography.     

Dental Age Estimation: A Test of the Reliability of Correctly Identifying a Subject Over 18 Years of Age Using the Gold Standard of Chronological Age as the Comparator

This study was designed to test the reliability of using the third molars to demarcate between child and adult status. A total of 2000 dental panoramic tomographs were used for assessment of the calculated age using the 8‐stage system of tooth development and applied to all four third molars. The LL8 was also assessed using this 8‐stage system. For each tooth development stage, the Normal distribution and percentile summary data were estimated. The calculated dental age compared with the chronological age was statistically significantly different (p < 0.001) for both females and males giving underestimates of the true age. Comparison of single tooth dental age and chronological age was only slightly different. The most important finding is that the assignment to above or below the 18‐year threshold, in the age range 17 years to 19 years, could be wrong on up to 50% of occasions.     

A 6-year experience with urine drug testing by family service agencies in Nova Scotia, Canada

The objective of this study is to describe a urine drug-testing program implemented for parents with a history of substance abuse by family service agencies in the province of Nova Scotia, Canada. Nurse collectors went to the parents' home to obtain urine specimens under direct observation and then delivered the specimens to the toxicology laboratory or arranged shipment by courier under chain of custody. Each urine specimen was screened for cannabinoids, cocaine metabolite, opiates, amphetamines and benzodiazepines, ethyl alcohol and creatinine. All positive screening tests were confirmed by another method such as gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS). In 15,979 urine specimens collected from 1994 to 1999, the percent positive rate for one (or more) drugs/metabolites ranged from 45.6% (1994-1996) to 30.0% (1998, 1999). A total of 575 specimens (3.7%) were dilute (urine creatinine <25mg/dl). Positive rates in 15,404 non-dilute specimens from 1994 to 1999 were as follows: cannabinoids - 11.7%, benzodiazepines - 11.3%, cocaine metabolite - 3.7%, and ethyl alcohol - 2.6%. Most clients provided less than 20 urine specimens for testing but some individuals submitted urine specimens more than 100 times in a 12-15-month period. Urine drug screening in parents with a history of substance abuse provided an objective and reliable indication of recent drug use in this population.     

In Defense of Patient-Centered Theories of Deontology: A Response to Liao and Barry

S. Matthew Liao and Christian Barry argue that the patient-centered approach to deontology that I have developed—the restricting claims principle (RCP)—‘is beset with problems.’ They think that it cannot correctly handle cases in which a potential victim sits in the path of an agent doing what she needs to do for some greater good, or in which a person’s property is used to benefit others and harm her. They argue that cases in which an agent does what would be permissible but acts on a malicious reason show that agent intentions, rather than patientclaims, are fundamental to deontology. And they claim that the RCP presupposes the means principle in a way that shows that it is not really offering anything new. I argue here that all of these charges are mistaken. Doing so allows me to offer important refinements to the RCP, to highlight two common mistakes in reasoning about cases, and to set challenges for agentcentered approaches to deontology.