In Defense of Patient-Centered Theories of Deontology: A Response to Liao and Barry

S. Matthew Liao and Christian Barry argue that the patient-centered approach to deontology that I have developed—the restricting claims principle (RCP)—‘is beset with problems.’ They think that it cannot correctly handle cases in which a potential victim sits in the path of an agent doing what she needs to do for some greater good, or in which a person’s property is used to benefit others and harm her. They argue that cases in which an agent does what would be permissible but acts on a malicious reason show that agent intentions, rather than patientclaims, are fundamental to deontology. And they claim that the RCP presupposes the means principle in a way that shows that it is not really offering anything new. I argue here that all of these charges are mistaken. Doing so allows me to offer important refinements to the RCP, to highlight two common mistakes in reasoning about cases, and to set challenges for agentcentered approaches to deontology.

     

Mental disorder as the cause of a crime

An offender's punishment can be reduced when a court decides that his mental disorder reduces his responsibility for what he did. Courts have sought to establish whether a mentally disordered offender's responsibility is reduced by asking whether his disorder caused the crime. Acceptance of this “causation by mental disorder” criterion has fluctuated, however. This may be because causal explanations are not the types of explanations we are accustomed to offering for the kinds of acts that bring defendants, and psychiatric witnesses, to court. More often, we offer what philosophers have called “possibility” explanations for these acts. The application of psychiatry to possibility explanations has not been widely explored. It offers the potential for the improved use of psychiatric evidence in criminal proceedings.