Comments on Doug Husak: The Low Cost of Recognizing (and of Ignoring) the Limited Relevance of Intentions to Permissibility

Doug Husak frames a worry that makes sense in the abstract, but in reality, there is not much to worry about. The thesis that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility (IIP) is a straw man. There are reasons to think that the moral significance of intentions is not properly registered in criminal law. But the moral basis for criticism is not nearly as extreme as the IIP, and the fixes are not that hard to make. Lastly, if they are not made, some people may not get the punishments they deserve, and there will be some extra inequities in the criminal law as a result. But these inequities are not so great that change must be made now. The moral categories that are used may be too crude, but they are also familiar and easy to work with, and that counts for something.

A Comparative Analysis of Social Impact Bond and Conventional Financing Approaches to Health Service Commissioning in England: The Case of Social Prescribing

Abstract

The article compares two social prescribing interventions in Northern England. One was financed through a Social Impact Bond (SIB) and the other was financed in a more conventional way. It utilises a comparative approach to understand the extent to which different methods of financing social prescribing conform to key features of the New Public Management (NPM) or New Public Governance (NPG) in their design and implementation. It finds that a SIB approach tends towards NPM during programme design and implementation and that this creates challenges for social prescribing programmes, the complexity of which appear better suited to an NPG-based relational approach.     

Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002–2009

Homemade bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are staple weapons of conflicts in South Asia and especially Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, where the Taliban, their affiliates, and other armed groups use them to undermine recognized governments and policies. This study establishes IED trends in the Afghanistan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimroz and the Pakistani province of Balochistan between 2002 and mid-2009, using geo-referenced open source IED event information and statistical or geospatial analysis techniques. This study also furnishes assessments of specific IED technologies, techniques, and procedures (TTPs; like explosively formed projectiles or radio-controlled “spider devices”) as well as discussions of their potential causes and observable effects. There are several major trends observed: a continuous increase in volume and lethality of attacks, more expansive geographic distribution of attacks, and multiple bombing campaigns overlapping in Quetta, Balochistan province, that are perpetrated by groups with different means, tactics, and objectives. The most IED-related violence occurred in Kandahar province from 2002–2008; however, Helmand province was the leading location of bomb events by early 2009. Although large population centers—such as the cities of Kandahar, Quetta, and Lashkar Gah in Helmand province—commonly experienced effective bombings, the trans-border routes through Zaranj in Nimroz province and Spin Boldak in Kandahar province were also prone to many lethal attacks. In particular, this study both confirms and scrutinizes the so-called Iraq effect, the phenomenon of knowledge-sharing between fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even though fighters who gained experience in the Iraq insurgency provided assistance and training to Taliban fighters, the evidence indicates that some developments in IEDs predated the Iraq conflict or were original to South Asia or other conflicts in history. This evidence provides support for a more generalized and global phenomenon here called “TTP acceleration,” whereby insurgent and terrorist advances in IED capabilities take progressively shorter periods of time to develop and transfer among groups, usually as a result of increased information-sharing opportunities and coincidental alignment of group objectives.     

Towards a model of asian plantation systems

This article is about the Shan opium-heroin problem which figures largely in many journalistic and academic accounts of political events in Burma, but which has, paradoxically, been neglected. Rather, it has been “hollywoodized” with images of “opium” armies, heroin “empires,” colorful drug “kings,” and warlord-princes, etc., to the extent that it has more or less become but a dramatic backdrop, an “exotic unknowable.” This article is a more mundane account of the opium-heroin phenomenon. I will deal with it from the economic-political perspective, with particular focus on the basic mechanism of the Shan opium-heroin industry. Specifically, I will deal with the actors involved and their role in what is the only viable and integrated (locally and internationally) industry to emerge from Burma in the over three decades of military rule. My contention, in sum, is that the Shan opium-heroin issue constitutes only a part of the regional and global informal complex of investment, trade, and profit, in which are involved a host of non-Shan actors, whose interests are primarily economic; that basically, it is a transnational/global agro-business, no different, in substance and dynamics, from any other lucrative agro-business; and that Shan peasants, and to some extent, rebel armies, cannot be in any way regarded as “winners” in, or the main beneficiaries of, the “illegal” and “unregulated” informal economy of investment, trade, and profit, that spans borders, regions, and oceans.