Non-State Actors,Political Opportunity Structures and Foreign Relations: The Case of Germany's Federation of Expellees and the ‘Foundation Flight,Expulsion and Reconciliation’

This article examines the political process leading to the creation of the controversial ‘Foundation Flight, Expulsion and Reconciliation’ in Germany. The foundation aims to establish a permanent exhibition by 2016 showcasing the flight and expulsion of up to fifteen million Germans from the East following the Second World War. The foundation was the result of lobbying by the Federation of Expellees (BdV); it caused frictions in Germany's relations with its eastern neighbours and jeopardised Germany's reconciliation process with these states. The process reveals that the structure of Germany's polity, paired with astute alliance building and its members' rhetoric, aided the BdV's cause. Thus, non-state actors can utilise favourable domestic structures for the lack of material resources in order to maximise their lobbying ‘power’. This contributes to the growing literature on reconciliation in international relations which neglects domestic structures as a variable determining reconciliation processes in favour of more normative policy instruments.     

Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts

In his recent book Attempts, Gideon Yaffe suggests that attempts should be criminalized because of a principle he dubs the “Transfer Principle.” This principle holds that if a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized. Although Yaffe provides a powerful defense of the Transfer Principle, in this paper I argue that Yaffe’s argument for it ultimately does not succeed. In particular, I formulate two objections to Yaffe’s argument for the Transfer Principle. First, I argue that a basic assumption about criminalization, on which Yaffe’s argument crucially depends, is incomplete, and Yaffe’s own attempt to supplement it undermines his argument for the Transfer Principle. Second, I argue that Yaffe’s argument does not properly account for the fact that those who merely attempt a crime and those who complete it might sometimes be responding to reasons in different ways. Accordingly, I conclude that Yaffe has not succeeded in establishing the truth of the Transfer Principle.     

Technology transfer in the Americas: common and divergent practices among major research universities and public sector institutions

The present article presents the results of a qualitative study whose purpose was to compare the structure and operation of the programs for intellectual property management and technology transfer, and the mechanisms through which to foster entrepreneurship, in five high-profile research institutions across the Americas. The institutions of focus included Stanford University and the University of California, Davis in the United States; the Universidad Católica and the Universidad de Concepción in Chile; and the National Scientific and Technical Research Council in Argentina. The purpose of the study was to elucidate commonalities and differences among these institutions with respect to their technology transfer practices, and to distill methodologies that could be used to establish or refine technology transfer offices in American regions. Research revealed common goals and core activities, shared and implemented in similar ways among all five institutions. However, the analysis also identified divergent areas within the structure and operation of the various technology transfer programs, representing significant differences between the five institutions.     

Francis Fukuyama: Democracy Needs Elites

“Populism exists because institutions are elite‐driven,” but democracies don't work well without elites, says the acclaimed author of The End of History.     

The Evolution of the Foreign Direct Investment Regime in the Americas

The purpose of this article is to describe the international regime governing foreign direct investment in the Americas and assess its implications for regional economic governance. The article develops a novel methodology to map the multi-layered patchwork of investment agreements according to the level of investment protection offered by each agreement. The mapping exercise demonstrates the existence of two distinct legalization projects in the Americas, one which broadly corresponds to the investment protection concerns of the United States, and a second, overlapping regime, which better reflects the interest of many Latin American governments in maintaining their policy autonomy. The article argues that these distinct visions are anchored in a common dispute settlement system based on binding international arbitration, which tends to harmonize the governance effects of the regime.