Signaling and Counter‐Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review

We leverage the institutional features of American courts to evaluate the importance of whistleblowers in hierarchical oversight. Drawing on a formal theory of signaling in the judicial hierarchy, we examine the role of whistleblowing dissents in triggering en banc review of three‐judge panels by full circuits of the Courts of Appeals. The theory generates predictions about how dissent interacts with judicial preferences to influence circuits' review and reversal decisions, which we test using original and existing data. First, we show that judges who dissent counter to their preferences are more likely to see their dissents lead to review and reversal. Second, we show that dissents are most influential when the likelihood of non‐compliance by a three‐judge panel is highest. Our results underscore the importance of dissent in the judicial hierarchy and illustrate how judicial whistleblowers can help appellate courts target the most important cases for review.     

Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from Experiments and Regression Discontinuities

Field experiments and regression discontinuity designs test whether voting is habit forming by examining whether a random shock to turnout in one election affects participation in subsequent elections. We contribute to this literature by offering a vast amount of new statistical evidence on the long‐term consequences of random and quasi‐random inducements to vote. The behavior of millions of voters confirms the persistence of voter turnout and calls attention to theoretically meaningful nuances in the development and expression of voting habits. We suggest that individuals become habituated to voting in particular types of elections. The degree of persistence appears to vary by electoral context and by the attributes of those who comply with an initial inducement to vote.     

Evolution,uncertainty, and the asymptotic efficiency of policy

Public Choice - Politics, like any social system, involves selection mechanisms. This paper presents a model of politics as an evolutionary process. Our model yields three main results. First, the...     

The collective welfare dimension of dark patterns regulation

Dark Patterns are interface design elements that can influence users' behaviour in digital environments. They can cause harm, not only on an individual but also a collective level, by creating behavioral market failures, reducing trust in markets and promoting unfair competition and data dominance. We contend that these collective effects of Dark Patterns cannot be tackled by existent laws, and thus call for policy intervention. This article reviews how existing and proposed laws in Europe and the US, namely the EU Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act as well as the U.S. DETOUR and AICO Acts, address these collective dimensions of welfare and add to existing protection. We find that the novel legislative measures attain that goal to varying degrees. However, the collective welfare perspective may prove useful to both support a risk-based approach to the enforcement and provide guidance as to which practices should be addressed as priority.     

Software-as-a-service – Legal nature: Shifting the existing paradigm of copyright law

Today's business environment is no longer defined exclusively by bricks and mortar. Business models of software distribution are constantly evolving as new technologies develop. Traditional retail versions of software products are mostly replaced with digital distribution of copies of software products. However, these ways of software distribution are by no means exhaustive. Functionality of software is not necessarily tied with provision of the copy of the relevant program to the user. Instead he can receive access to it via the Internet without the need to install software onto his computer. This type of business model received the name “Software-as-a-Service” (SaaS) or, sometimes “Cloud Computing”. The legal nature of relations arising between the user and provider of distant access to such software is subject to considerable debate in Russia. The main problem is that at first glance it resembles the features of various types of contracts, recognized in the Civil Code of Russia, although not falling completely within any of them. At the same time the type of agreement chosen by the parties defines the legal framework, which governs relevant relations and relevant tax consequences. This article aims to analyze the nature of existing relations between the user and SaaS-provider and to define whether it can be characterized as a license, service, lease or some kind of sui generis contract. Based on the analysis the author comes to a conclusion that as delivery of copies of software becomes less and less relevant for the software industry, due to the new business models implemented by vendors, the rights to use the particular copy of software around which the traditional copyright regime has been built, become more and more superseded with the right to access such software. Thus traditional contractual models developed for IP distribution (license agreements, assignment agreements) and, more generally, the legal framework of existing copyright law that is centered on the core idea of the “use” of the copy, are no longer adequate regulators in the digital era where remote access to objects of copyright will soon start to dominate.     

Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy

One way that principals can overcome the problem of informational asymmetries in hierarchical organizations is to enable whistleblowing. We evaluate how whistleblowing influences compliance in the judicial hierarchy. We present a formal model in which a potential whistleblower may, at some cost, signal noncompliance by a lower court to a higher court. A key insight of the model is that whistleblowing is most informative when it is rare. While the presence of a whistleblower can increase compliance by lower courts, beyond a certain point blowing the whistle is counterproductive and actually reduces compliance. Moreover, a whistleblower who is a “perfect ally” of the higher court (in terms of preferences) blows the whistle too often. Our model shows an important connection between the frequency of whistleblowing and the effectiveness of whistleblowing as a threat to induce compliance in hierarchical organizations.     

Sumptuary administration: How contested market actors shape the trajectory of policy when regulated under fragmented governance

In contemporary society, sumptuary laws regulate contested markets by delegating enforcement responsibilities to the private sector. This can decouple the intention behind policies from the practices to implement them. When state interests do not align concerning the legality of a market, can policy and practice recouple, and if so, how? This article reports on a case study of commercial cannabis in the United States to answer this question. Interviews with 56 cannabis industry stakeholders in California, Arizona, and Texas reveal that policy and practice recoupled through a patterned process that I call sumptuary administration. In each state, regulators drew on a unique set of schemas, or “framework of accountability,” that prioritized a subset of cannabis market participants during the policy-making process. This resulted in missing or ambiguous sumptuary laws. To address business challenges that were tethered to this regulatory environment, cannabis businesses drew on similar schemas to identify appropriate practices. I show how grounding practices in these frameworks legitimized the preferences of the cannabis industry in the eyes of state authorities and influenced specific program policy revisions. Sumptuary administration represents a novel mechanism for understanding the social construction of legality in markets that are regulated under fragmented governance.     

In Defense of the Standard Picture: Overcoming Death by a Thousand Cuts

In a previous article, I defended the standard picture of law (or SP), so labeled by its foremost critic, Mark Greenberg. In that article, I addressed Greenberg's root-and-branch critique of the SP and, to a much lesser extent, a related critique by Scott Hershovitz. But the Greenberg and Hershovitz frontal attacks on the SP are not its only threats. Some theorists, while not attacking the SP directly, give accounts of law that the SP cannot accommodate. Those theorists will be challenged here, because if they are correct, the SP is not a tenable account of law.