Rebuilding Ukraine's hollow State: Developing a democratic public service in Ukraine

This article describes assistance that is being provided as part of an institution building project with a view to making a lasting impact on the development of a democratic public service of Ukraine. It explains the nature of the project and the strategies adopted to overcome difficulties. It compares and contrasts approaches adopted by technical assistance projects in assisting administrative reform. It also examines the special nature of the Ukraine project that arises out of the distinctive context and needs of Ukraine. The article continues by examining the role of external assistance in validating the Ukrainian Institute of Public Administration and Local Government's Masters in Public Administration and the contribution made to the development and delivery of the Masters programme. A special feature of the project is the series of one-month internships when IPALG students visit London. The internship programme allows students to identify aspects of UK experience relevant to changes that Ukraine wishes to make in its administrative culture. As part of this programme, students are placed in government organizations and NGOs. The placements are complemented by a series of change management seminars that enable students to evaluate options for change, to assess their own role in the change process and recognize the key stages in the change process. The project team has undertaken a full evaluation of the first presentation of the programme and the article presents the findings.     

Gender,education and the new christian right

She has written several articles on Evangelicals and the Christian School Movement in the United States and on North American evangelical activity in Guatemala. Her most recent publication is Keeping Them Out of the Hands of Satan: Evangelical Schooling in America.     

The 1984 election as Anthony downs and Stanley Kelley might interpret it

This paper is an analysis of two rational choice theories of elections. Anthony Downs and Stanley Kelley's theories yield complementary interpretations of the 1984 U. S. election. Reagan's victory was based on both prospective and retrospective judgments as well as on candidate and policy considerations. Reagan won that element of an incumbent's reelection that is a referendum on his performance as president. However, people also voted on the basis of domestic and foreign policy preferences for the second term. On these issues voters preferred Mondale as much as Reagan. Reagan's victory owed remarkably little to his conservative agenda and to a warm regard for his personal qualities as a leader. His landslide was deceptive. The two Reagan victories were among the weakest of the six landslides of the postwar period by Kelley's test of decisiveness. The Reagan elections have not set the United States on the course of a long-term conservative agenda in either domestic or foreign affairs.     

Dillon's Rule Under the Burger Court: The Municipal Liability Cases

Under the Burger Court, the constitutional relationship betweenstates and their municipalities has been examined primarilyin cases involving private suits initiated against municipalitiesunder federal antitrust and civil rights statutes. Since theCourt's 1943 Parker v. Brown decision, it had been presumedthat municipalities as political subdivisions of states wereas immune as their states from tort liability under the ShermanAntitrust Act. The Burger Court, however, ruled that municipalitiesare not automatically immunized from tort liability simply becauseof their status as political subdivisions unless they can demonstratethat their actions were undertaken pursuant to an expressedstate policy. After 1980, the Court continued to uphold thevulnerability of municipalities to private suits authorizedby federal statutes, but moved to narrow the types of remedyappropriate under common law. The Burger Court did not, therefore,address the more fundamental question of whether municipalitiesas public actors should be liable to private damages in thecourse of their public functions.     

Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?

This paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians' ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain. Using panel data from the American states, I find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle. That is, while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year, this pattern does not exist in states with strict “no-carry” rules. Neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle.