How Does Decentralized Governance Work? Evidence from China

Decentralized governance is often viewed as an effective way to improve public services and government accountability. Many also document the negative dimensions of fiscal decentralization, especially in transition economies; thus, the combination of decentralization and centralized control has gained currency in some countries in recent years. Based on first-hand data and other documentary sources, and using civil service remuneration as an example, this paper attempts to explore how decentralized governance works in China and what hinders decentralization from performing better. The findings show that Chinese centralized control over expenditure in public sector remuneration primarily serves to enhance ministry control. Local bureaucrats, meanwhile, exploit better remuneration to boost their personal interests. This paper argues that political commitment rather than central transfer is greatly needed for utilizing the benefits of decentralized governance.     

Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding

In chapter 6 of Attempts, Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is ??possible to attempt crimes of negligence?? (2010, p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that ??attempt crimes of negligence?? is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for ??attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.?? But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following thesis: Not only can one attempt to bring it about that one commits a crime of negligence, but the attempt can be successful as well.     

From Performance Budgeting to Performance Budget Management: Theory and Practice

This article examines the decades‐long practices of performance budgeting in different countries and their associated challenges from a multilayered institutional framework. Based on theory and lessons learned, the article recommends an array of strategies to address institutional and organizational barriers. It also proposes to reconceptualize performance budgeting as a performance budget management system and suggests how multiyear budget planning, financial risk assessment, policy planning, the departmental budget cycle, the program budget cycle, stakeholder engagement, regular spending reviews, and performance audits should be integrated more closely to address the long‐term fiscal challenges faced by many governments and to respond to the public pressure on agencies to do more with less.     

A critique of ADB policies towards the Greater Mekong Sub-region

This article takes issue with the rhetorical construction of what constitutes a “regional market economy” that informs much official thinking around the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Program. It is argued that this is a limited construction that privileges the unimpeded movement of goods and resources within the area. Missing from this construct are more fundamental dimensions of what constitutes a proper “economy,” such as production and the institutional foundation to support such activity. Without these, the GMS may be constrained in its future development, rising little beyond an entrepôt basis. If the Program is to realise its full promise, further initiatives will be required, particularly to firmly embed a productive capacity within the region and establish a coherent institutional framework in its support.     

Caught between Europe and the orient: Israel and the EMP

As the case of Transnistria illustrates, the politico-economic arrangements of de facto states are marked by a tendency to sacrifice the economy to political objectives. Despite non-recognition and limited local resources, these entities manage to make use of their ambiguous status and external support to sustain their claims to statehood. Yet, the priority of these claims over economic development, as well as strategies of survival in general can have unintended effects on unrecognised state-building projects, such as the emergence of a spin-off opposition or public disillusionment.     

Public health in Burma: Anatomy of a crisis

Burma has been ruled by a military government since 1962. A steady deterioration in public health standards has accompanied such rule, with a particularly marked decline following the crushing of the pro-democracy movement in that country in 1988. This article draws attention to a number of aspects of this decline and the growing precariousness of the overall public health system. As it will be suggested, primary responsibility for this state of decay should be borne by the military regime. Through several policies and practices, the military has severely compromised the functioning of the public health system and perverted it in ways that fulfill its narrow political interests, rather than those of the nation as a whole. The article concludes by emphasizing the urgent need for a reinstatement of democratic norms and institutions in Burma, so that the nation's public health needs may be meaningfully addressed and a looming humanitarian disaster averted.     

Determinants of government size: evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of government size at the provincial level in China. We employ the panel data model as a platform for empirical analysis and control for endogeneity in the study. Our study shows that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may curtail government expansion, and that the provincial-level public sector is characterized by economies of scale. This study also documents that Wagner’s law does not hold true for China. Moreover, both expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization contribute to the expansion of China’s government.     

Russian banking since the crisis of 1998

Banking is one of the most difficult areas in the transition process. In Russia most reforms were less smooth than in the formerly socialist countries of central Europe and creation of a financial sector met with weak regulations and an opportunistic and weak government. The financial crisis of 1998 was therefore not the result of unforeseeable external events but one of limitless recklessness. The paper describes the major problems in building up a banking sector before 1998 and identifies the major reasons for the crisis. Crisis management also turned out to be atypical. Instead of seizing the opportunity to carry out necessary reforms, in particular a regulatory overhaul, not much happened. Now nearly ten years after the reform, the banking system has strengthened thanks to a very pronounced macroeconomics boom based on favourable terms of trade. The major weaknesses survive however under the cover of strong growth of the economy.