Efficacy in small electorates under plurality and approval voting

Assuming independent voting and random tie-breaking, we describe a procedure for computing the efficacy of a voting strategy under approval voting (AV) and plurality voting (PV) in single winner elections. When the number of candidates exceeds three, the voter's efficacy — his or her ability to affect the outcome of an election — is greater under AV than PV. The relative advantage of AV over PV increases as the number of voters or number of candidates increases.This study has been supported by grant 84-00329 of the U.S.A.-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel, in collaboration with Steven Brams and Zeev Maoz.     

Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage,non-ranked voting procedures

Rapoport, Felsenthal and Maoz (1988) have proposed three alternative methods to discern the fair proportion of seats that a party in a representative assembly ought to receive as a function of voters' preference orderings. All three methods assume that the ratio between the number of voters preferring party i over j to the number of voters preferring party j over i can be tested for consistency, and, if sufficiently consistent, can be appropriately scaled to discover the proportion of seats each party ought to receive. Using these methods as standards, we use exit-poll data gathered during the 1985 elections to the general convention of the Israeli General Federation of Labor (Histadrut) to examine the extent to which plurality- and approval-voting procedures provide a fair allocation of seats. The findings indicate that: (a) all three methods yield sufficiently consistent matrices of preference ratios; (b) the plurality- and the approval-voting procedures yielded significantly different proportional representations; (c) the proposed proportion of seats according to the three aggregation methods fall midway between the proportion of seats that the plurality and the approval procedures allocate. We discuss practical implications of these findings. Requests for reprints should be sent to: Professor Amnon Rapoport, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Davie Hall 013A, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.     

Adolescent idolization of pop singers: Causes,expressions, and reliance

The study examines the phenomenon of adolescents' idolization of pop singers. Male and female adolescents from three age groups (ages 10–11, 13–14, and 16–17) were compared with regard to the intensity of idolization, its behavioral manifestations, causes for selecting the idol, and reliance for knowledge on the idol. The results of self-reports indicated that the phenomenon of idolization, expressed especially in worshipping and modeling, is strongest in the youngest age group and decreases in intensity with age. Also, it was found that girls idolize singers more than boys. The youngest age group, especially girls, rely on singers with regard to knowledge concerning personal matters. These findings were explained within the frameworks of gender differences, adolescence characteristics, and youth culture development.This paper was prepared while the first and the third authors were on sabbatical at the Department of Psychology, Maryland University, College Park, Maryland.Received Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the Hebrew University, 1974. Research interests include school psychology, social cognition, and media psychology.Received Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of Pittsburgh, 1974. Research interests include political psychology, social psychology, and social development.Received Ph.D. in statistics from the Hebrew University, 1976. Research interests concern applied statistics and nonparametric statistics.Received MA in clinical child psychology, Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University.     

Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints

The impact of a budget constraint on individual expenditures is examined in two models of two-stage contests with homogenous and risk-neutral players competing to win a single, indivisible, commonly valued rent. The set of players is partitioned into equally sized groups. In the first model, one contestant from each group survives to compete on the second stage against the other survivors. In the second model, one group survives the first stage and its members compete against each other on the second stage. We derive and discuss the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium solution for each model.     

Reviews

Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (An extensively revised and enlarged edition by Jerry F. Hough of Merle Fainsod's How Russia is Ruled). Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1979, xiv + 679 pp. £12.00.

Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt. London: Macmillan Press, 1979, 271 pp. £12.00.

Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970 (Revised Edition). New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: Praeger Publishers, 1978. 373 pp.

Daniel Park, Oil and Gas in Comecon Countries, London: Kogan Page & New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1979. 240 pp. £15.00.

Avi Shlaim and G. N. Yannopoulos (eds.), The EEC and Eastern Europe. London: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 251 pp. £15.00.

Daniel Tarschys, The Soviet Political Agenda: Problems and Priorities, 1950–1970. London: Macmillan Press, 1979. i + 217 pp. £10.00.

Soviet Society and the Communist Party, edited by Karl W. Ryavec. Amherst, Mass.: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. xviii + 220 pp. $15.00.

Richard Stites, The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978. xxi + 464 pp. $37.50.

Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Women Under Communism. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1978. x + 291 pp. $16.00.

Norman Saul, Sailors in Revolt. The Russian Baltic Fleet in 1917. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978. xii + 312 pp.

Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1917–18. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1979. xiii + 462 pp. £15.00.

William O. McCagg, Jr. Stalin Embattled, 1943–1948. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978. 423 pp. $18.95.

Arvind Vyas, Consumption in a Socialist Economy. The Soviet Industrialization Experience, 1929–1937. Foreword by Maurice Dobb. New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1978. xii + 239 pp. Rs. 50.00.

Alfred D. Low, The Sino‐Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics. London: Associated University Presses, 1977. 364 pp. £8.25.

Morris Rothenberg, Whither China: The View from the Kremlin. University of Miami. Monographs in International Affairs, xxi + 310 pp.

Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. 216 pp. £8.75.

A. Szymanski, Is the red flag flying? London: Zed Press, 1979. 235 pp. Paperback £2.95.

John Dunstan, Paths to Excellence and the Soviet School. Windsor: NFER Publishing Co., 1978. 302 pp. £9.75.

Leopold H. Haimson (ed.), The Politics of Rural Russia 1905–1914 (Studies of the Russian Insitute, Columbia University). Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979. x + 309 pp. $19.50/£13.65.

R. W. Seton‐Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence, 1906–1941, Vol. II 1918–1941. Introduction by H. & C. Seton‐Watson. London and Zagreb: British Academy and University of Zagreb, Institute of Croatian History, 1976. 468 pp. + 474 pp. (two books).     

Where have all the heroes gone? A rational-choice perspective on heroism

Heroism emerges when individual decisions are coupled with public rewards for heroic actions, making heroism akin to the voluntary provision of a highly specialized public good. In the past 35 years, however, the number of heroes has fallen considerably as reflected by military honors such as the Congressional Medal of Honor. Our model, which seeks to explain heroism in a rational decision-making framework, suggests that an observed decline in heroism can be explained on the basis of optimal individual and social responses, rather than as an arbitrary change in the governmental rewards for heroism.     

Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players

We compare experimentally two contest designs. In the between-group design (BGD), cohorts compete with one another in stage 1 and a single cohort is then advance to stage 2. In stage 2, members of this cohort compete for a single prize. In the within-group design (WGD), the order of the competition is reversed. Our findings support the theoretical conclusion that the WGD is superior to BGD in generating more expenditure. They also show that if the cohorts are fixed, small, and interact repeatedly over time, then tacit collusion in the WGD, but not the BGD, leads to suppression of expenditures.