Rechtzeitige Rüge bei fehlerhafter Gerichtsbesetzung

Bei Beurteilung, ob dem Beschwerdeführer der die Nichtigkeit nach § 281 Abs 1 Z 1 StPO begründende Tatumstand schon vor (oder sp?testens bis zum Ende) der Hauptverhandlung bekannt geworden ist, ist auf objektive Kriterien, n?mlich die Zug?nglichkeit des Tatsachensubstrats abzustellen. Nichtigkeit iSd § 281 Abs 1 Z 1 StPO liegt nur bei willkürlichem, mithin sachlich ungerechtfertigtem Austausch der Laienrichter vor.     

Die gesetzliche Ausgestaltung der mietvertraglichen Erhaltungspflicht und die Grenzen ihrer Disponibilität (2. Teil)

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The European policy-making machinery in the Berlin republic: hindrance or handmaiden?

This article examines European policy-making in the Berlin Republic. The basic puzzle explored is whether the policy machinery is able to facilitate the projection of a ‘new European policy’, characterised by greater emphasis upon national interests. In order to suggest answers, the article reviews the origins of the policy machinery and the changes made in the pre-unification period. It then explores the current situation in the Berlin Republic. It argues that the legacies of the past – institutional pluralism and the post-war adoption of a European identity – are not easily cast off. Although the machinery has been reorganised since 1990, notably under the Schröder/Fischer coalition, and there have been some adjustments to bilateral relations, a new European policy has not yet emerged, although it is a possible future scenario.     

The invisible hand plays dice: multiple equilibria in sects markets

Religious participation is much more widespread in the United States than in Europe, while Europeans tend to view sects more suspiciously than Americans. We propose an explanation for these patterns without assuming differences in preferences or market fundamentals. We study a religious market where both demand and supply of spiritual services are endogenous. Such markets may have multiple equilibria. Further, equilibria with more sects result in higher welfare and lower membership costs, as secular societies tend to host on average more demanding sects.