Bewilligung der Adoption: Zustimmung der Mutter erforderlich, deren Aufenthalt bei Beschlussfassung erster Instanz bekannt ist

Die Voraussetzungen für die Bewilligung der Adoption sind nach der Sach- und Rechtslage im Zeitpunkt der Beschlussfassung erster Instanz zu beurteilen. Auch der Kreis der Zustimmungsberechtigten bestimmt sich nach diesem Zeitpunkt; es ist kein Grund erkennbar, die Voraussetzungen für den Entfall des Zustimmungserfordernisses nach § 181 Abs 2 ABGB nach einem anderen Zeitpunkt zu beurteilen. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt kann sich auch eine Mutter, die keine ausdrückliche Zustimmung zur Adoption erteilt hat und mehr als sechs Monate unbekannten Aufenthaltes war, gegen diese aussprechen. Vor Bewilligung der Adoption besteht kein rechtlich geschütztes Vertrauen auf deren Zustandekommen. Der mit dem Bewilligungsverfahren notwendigerweise verbundene Schwebezustand muss von den Wahleltern wegen der grundrechtlich geschützten Rechtsstellung der leiblichen Eltern hingenommen werden. Trotz Fehlens einer ausdrücklichen Rsp des OGH zu einer konkreten Fallgestaltung liegt dann keine erhebliche Rechtsfrage vor, wenn das Gesetz selbst eine eindeutige Regelung trifft oder ein Streitfall trotz neuer Sachverhaltselemente bereits mit Hilfe vorhandener Leitlinien h?chstgerichtlicher Rsp gel?st werden kann.     

Discovering the Dark Side of Power: The Principal’s Moral Hazard in Political-Bureaucratic Relations

Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as “bureaucratic drift”, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal’s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions.     

Challenging the "Received View": De-demonizing Hamas

Abstract

Violence against abortion clinics and other activities directed toward patients and staff of abortion facilities have been termed terrorism by the pro‐choice movement. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation denies that these actions are terrorism. Instances of abortion clinic violence for 1982–1987 were examined in order to determine whether there is a correspondence between these incidents and definitions or models of terrorism. It appears that these incidents do fit the classification of “limited political” or ‘subrevolutionary” terrorism. Reasons why the FBI has made the decision not to include these acts as forms of terrorism are entertained. One is that current international tensions have resulted in a preoccupation with only certain types of events which for administrative, i.e., juris‐dictional, reasons have come to essentialize terrorism. Another explanation, posited by pro‐choice activists, is that the FBI's decision is a consequence of political influence: the current administration is openly anti‐choice.     

Strategic or Principled? The Engagement of Civil Society Organizations with the EU

This article links the literature on the Europeanization of civil society organizations (CSOs) with the literature on the contribution CSOs can make to democracy in the EU. To do so, it asks which are the pull factors that support CSOs’ Europeanization: are they mostly strategic and linked to where law-making and the money are? Or are they likewise linked to a desire to contribute to EU democracy? To explore this question, the article looks at agricultural, environmental and anti-poverty groups and combines fresh qualitative with quantitative data. The findings suggest that we need to distinguish strategic Europeanization, on the one hand, from the identification with supranational democracy, on the other. They also show that the most Europeanized organizations need not be the most interested in EU democracy, whereas organizations with a comparatively low degree of Europeanization can still be interested in EU democracy.