Keynes and the Non-neutrality of Russian War Finance during World War One

This article examines the particular methods of war finance that were used by Russia during World War One in relation to the total cost of the war, and evaluates them against a theoretical ideal that was outlined by the Cambridge economist J. M. Keynes. It then asks whether there were any consequences of two particular chosen means of financing the war—the issue of large amounts of paper currency and short-term treasury bills—for maintaining Russian economic stability. The evaluations of a number of Russian and British economists are used as gauges of Keynes's advice, and also as more general comparison in relation to the equivalent policies pursued by other Allied countries.     

Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the security dilemma

The People's Republic of China's turbulent experience during the Cold War (1949–1991) has been followed by a remarkably tranquil period. Although conflict and crisis have certainly not been completely absent in the post-Cold War era, the PRC has managed to undertake three decades of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’. What explains this remarkably peaceful great power ascent? Prominent scholars, such as Thomas Christensen and Iain Johnston, stress the utility of the security dilemma in understanding the PRC's security behavior since the end of the Cold War. Can the PRC's peaceful rise in recent decades be attributed to a realization of the centrality of the security dilemma in great power politics acquired during the Cold War? This paper concludes that the security dilemma does not seem central to China's thinking about its relations with other powers, including the United States.     

National Environmental Ministries: Managers or Ciphers of European Union Environmental Policy?

European political integration has added a new and exciting dimension to the study of national political and administrative systems. However, comparatively little is know about the precise role of national ministries of state in either facilitating or retarding the shift towards joint rule making at the European level. Taking as an example the UK Department of the Environment's (DoE) involvement in the cumulative development of EU environmental policy since 1970, this paper examines the extent to which national environmental departments manage the process of integration or whether they are dragged along by it. It concentrates on the DoE's role in negotiating the 1987 Single European Act. It suggests that integration in the environmental sector since the Act has proceeded significantly further and faster than British negotiators originally expected, though through little conscious effort by the DoE. In fact, the DoE strongly opposed the introduction of majority voting, but was overruled by the core executive. These findings are examined against two theoretical approaches to European integration in order to reach a fuller understanding of what motivates (parts of) the British state to limit national autonomy in the process of developing European environmental rules.     

Sex and Race: Are Black Candidates More Likely to be Disadvantaged by Sex Scandals?

A growing body of work suggests that exposure to subtle racial cues prompts white voters to penalize black candidates, and that the effects of these cues may influence outcomes indirectly via perceptions of candidate ideology. We test hypotheses related to these ideas using two experiments based on national samples. In one experiment, we manipulated the race of a candidate (Barack Obama vs. John Edwards) accused of sexual impropriety. We found that while both candidates suffered from the accusation, the scandal led respondents to view Obama as more liberal than Edwards, especially among resentful and engaged whites. Second, overall evaluations of Obama declined more sharply than for Edwards. In the other experiment, we manipulated the explicitness of the scandal, and found that implicit cues were more damaging for Obama than explicit ones.     

Regulation by litigation

We believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).     

Disasters as Crisis Triggers for Critical Junctures? The 1976 Guatemala Case

This article focuses on the 1976 Guatemala earthquake disaster as a possible crisis trigger, in a relatively strict application of the critical juncture analytical approach. It expands to include the broader question of what conditions might cause disasters to trigger crises that open critical junctures for nation‐states. The research concludes that the 1976 Guatemala disaster led to a high degree of community self‐organizing and alliance‐building across Guatemala, which the Guatemalan national security state at that time perceived as a fundamental crisis requiring a response. This reaction generated significant debate and policy conflict within the state; the resulting decision was massively repressive violence, with legacies that continue to this day. Another conclusion is that strictly applied, critical juncture analysis can untangle often very complicated disaster postimpact emergency, recovery, and reconstruction situations.