Scaling-up natural resource management: insights from research in Latin America

Scaling-up local innovations in natural resource management (NRM) involves learning that is centred around three themes: promoting local-level innovation, understanding why local innovations work in specific contexts, and reflecting on their relevance in other geographical and social contexts. Successful scaling-up depends in part upon the relationships among multiple stakeholders at different levels around this learning. The experiences of researchers supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) provide insights into four questions: What is scaling-up? Why scale-up? What to scale-up? and How to scale-up? The authors propose that scaling-up is a multi-stakeholder process consisting of five components including: framing the context, promoting participation, fostering learning, strengthening institutions, and disseminating successful experiences. Key bottlenecks to scaling-up are the absence of open communication and the mutual recognition among stakeholders of each other's rights, responsibilities, and roles.     

Institutional and management building in Sub-Saharan Africa: a symposium

In the latter half of the 20th century many factors have contributed to the decline of Africa and especially of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Severe drought and the resultant famine, the international environment of deteriorating export markets, economic and bureaucratic mismanagement, environmental damage and rural decline, political instability and civil wars are some factors often highlighted as representative causes of the decline.     

Valence and Campaigns

We present a model of two‐candidate elections in which candidates are office‐motivated, campaigning is voluntary and costly, and one candidate has a valence advantage. In equilibrium, the order of campaign announcements matters: Each candidate would prefer to announce his or her position after the other candidate has announced his or hers. The fundamental predictions of the model are (1) the impact of valence and campaigning costs on candidates' equilibrium behaviors is in general ambiguous, requiring further specification of the details of the electoral situation, and (2) in general, equilibrium platform announcements are essentially independent of the location of the median voter's ideal point. In addition, the model is consistent with elections in which both, only one, or neither candidate actively campaigns, and, finally, even when one candidate has a large valence advantage, there might be no equilibrium in which he or she will win the election with certainty.