Adolescent Sexual Timetables

Young people's age expectations for the Initiation by boys and girls of a range of sexual practices were elicited from a sample of 522 15- and 16-year-olds. As expected, there was a progression in the modal ages nominated from the least intimate (kissing) to more intimate behaviors (sexual intercourse). There were few gender differences, either for age expectations of the practices of boys and girls or between male and female respondents. There was a strong relationship between sexual timetables and timetables for autonomy and use of common drugs such as alcohol, and several marker sexual behaviors were identified that may signify the appropriateness of a range of sexual practices, It is suggested that there is a group of young people whose desire for early autonomy, substance use, and belief in early sexual activity may put them at risk.     

“Just give me a number!” Practical values for the social discount rate

A major reason the quality of cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) varies widely is inconsistent use of the social discount rate (SDR). This article offers guidance about the choice of the SDR. Namely, we recommend the following procedures: If the project is intragenerational (does not have effects beyond 50 years) and there is no crowding out of private investment, then discount all flows at 3.5 percent; if the project is intragenerational and there is some crowding out of investment, then weight investment flows by the shadow price of capital of 1.1 and then discount at 3.5 percent; if the project is intergenerational and there is no crowding out of investment, then use a time‐declining scale of discount rates; if the project is intergenerational and investment is crowded out, then convert investment flows during the first 50 years to consumption equivalents using a shadow price of 1.1, and then discount all of these flows at 3.5 percent, and discount all flows after the 50th year using time‐declining rates. We then compare current discounting practices of U.S. federal agencies with our estimates. Consistent use of the recommended rates would eliminate arbitrary choices of discount rates and would lead to better public sector decision‐making. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Strategy and Accountability: Structural Reform Litigation and Public Management

Structural reform litigation involves legal action against public bureaucracies alleging that an official has violated the legal rights of an agency's client. A pattern of rights infringements raises the specter of systemic dysfunction. If the court finds for the plaintiffs, or if the defendant agency agrees to settle, the remedy reconstitutes agency operations. What are the incentives faced by public managers whose agencies are involved in structural reform litigation? How might public managers retain public accountability while strategically using the institutional arrangements present in such cases? This article examines these questions through a spatial bargaining model and discusses its analytical implications in the context of a comprehensive suit against the child welfare agency in Kansas City, Missouri.     

Building the Administrative State

Books reviewed in this article:
Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928
David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency: Design Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997     

Popular Interpretations of ‘Corruption’ and their Partisan Consequences

Using a large six-city exit poll from 2000, we examine popular judgments of what constitutes “political corruption” in the United States. We find two distinct evaluative dimensions: corruption understood as lawbreaking, and corruption as favoritism. These judgments are heavily conditioned by the voter’s socioeconomic background and are politically consequential. Subjective understandings of “corruption” shape perceptions of how much corruption actually exists in government. Furthermore, and more importantly, these normative assessments play a significant part in voting decisions. Individuals who judged illegal activities such as bribe-taking to be “corrupt” were more inclined to back one of the major party candidates in 2000; those who believed that favoritism in politics was “corrupt” (e.g., an official recommending an unemployed friend for a government job) were more likely to vote for Al Gore or Ralph Nader.     

The Rise of 'New' Policy Instruments in Comparative Perspective: Has Governance Eclipsed Government?

Governance is a term in good currency, but there are still too few detailed empirical analyses of the precise extent to which it has or has not eclipsed government. This article explores the temporal and spatial characteristics of the governance transition by charting the deployment of new policy instruments in eight industrialised states and the European Union. The adoption and implementation of ('old' and 'new') policy instruments offer a useful analytical touchstone because governance theory argues that regulation is the quintessence of government. Although there are many 'new' environmental policy instruments in these nine jurisdictions, this article finds that the change from government to governance is highly differentiated across political jurisdictions, policy sectors and even the main instrument types. Crucially, many of the new policy instruments used require some state involvement (that is, 'government'), and very few are entirely devoid of state involvement (that is, pure 'governance'). Far from eclipsing government, governance therefore often complements and, on some occasions, even competes with it, although there are some cases of fusion. Future research should thus explore the many complex and varied ways in which government and governance interact in public policy-making.     

Editorial

Liverpool Law Review -     

The Retreat from Government Support for Social Dialogue in the Australian Public Service

This article explores the impact of the Coalition government's federal public sector reforms since 1996 in the Australian Public Service (APS). Under the Labor governments from 1983 to 1996, a range of measures operated to facilitate the development of social dialogue practices in the APS. There were also various mechanisms for consultation, information sharing and employee participation in decision-making, such as the Joint Council and Departmental Councils, statutory provisions for Industrial Democracy Plans, award provisions for consultation over business restructuring and support for consultative structures under enterprise bargaining and health and safety legislation. Nearly all of these measures have been dismantled or downgraded since the Coalition government came to office, especially those requiring consultation with trade unions or providing unions with a central role in participative mechanisms. It is argued here that the government's reforms have involved a substantial reduction in formal support for social dialogue in the APS, and a rejection of the benefits that such an approach offers.