Ḥājji Ratan or Bābā Ratan’s Multiple Identities

This article deals with the complex personality and legacy of a mysterious saint known both as a Sufī (Ḥājji Ratan) and a Nāth Yogī (Ratannāth) and links his multiple identity as well as the religious movement originated from him, to the specific cultural context of the former North-West Indian provinces. The first part is devoted to Ratan in the Nāth Yogī tradition, the second to his many facets in the Muslim tradition, in connection with his dargāh in the Panjabi town of Bhatinda. The third and main part explores a particular movement, the Har Śri Nāth tradition. Presently centered around a “dargāh mandir” in Delhi, this movement, with its two branches issued from Ratan and from his “son” Kāyānāth, was rooted in what is now Pakistan. The influence of location and history has led to many peculiarities which lead us to stress the blurred boundaries between Islam and Hinduism and the essential part played by charismatic figures in the construction of religious identities.     

Correlates of Behavioral Outcomes in Sexually Abused Children

The present study attempted to identify individual and contextual factors associated with outcomes in a group of 63 latency-aged children disclosing sexual abuse (SA). Children reporting SA were found to display greater internalizing and externalizing behavioral difficulties as well as more sexualized behaviors relative to same-age non-abused peers. Mothers also reported these children as less socially competent than their peers. Family contextual factors appeared to be associated with behavioral difficulties and made a unique contribution to the prediction of externalizing and sexualized behaviors. Of the personal variables, avoidance coping was found to be linked to poorer outcomes. In examining possible factors linked to ‘resilient’ outcomes in a 6-month time-frame, family conflict and avoidance coping were found to be associated to clinical status in children reporting SA.     

Can corruption foster regulatory compliance?

The legal and economic literatures overwhelmingly support the notion that regulatory compliance is always less in the presence of corruption. This paper departs from those literatures and shows that, whenever public officials are paid fixed wages, an increase in corruption may actually foster compliance. The conditions that make this possible are laid down in a theoretical model. Empirical evidence that corroborates the theoretical findings is provided using firm-level data for 26 transition economies.