Equity and cost-effectiveness of multilateral adaptation finance: are they friends or foes?

This paper analyzes potential criteria to allocate international funding for adaptation to climate change, as a response to one of the main governance challenges of international adaptation funding—the prioritization of project proposals given scarce funding. Based on the review of the equity and cost-effectiveness literature and relevant policy documents, we identify three potential indicators for equity (vulnerability level, poverty, equal funding per capita), and three indicators for cost-effectiveness (economic savings in absolute and relative terms, human lives saved). Applying these simple indicators to information provided in all 39 project documents considered by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) in 2011, we find that projects approved or endorsed by the AFB rank high according to one cost-effectiveness indicator (absolute economic savings), while they rather rank low according to all equity and further cost-effectiveness indicators. Furthermore, we analyze whether equity and cost-effectiveness are two contradicting goals, or whether ways can be found to reconcile both goals in multilateral adaptation finance. We conclude from both the theory and the 39 analyzed project documents that a pure economic definition of cost-effectiveness tends to be in contradiction with equity but that trade-offs between equity and cost-effectiveness can be limited if relative economic savings or human live savings are used as indicator for cost-effectiveness.     

Welfare Nationalism and Popular Support for Raising the Child Allowance: Evidence from a Norwegian Survey Experiment

Refugee and labour immigration have placed the issue of immigrants’ access to welfare benefits high on the political agenda. This article explores how voter preferences for increases in the child benefit change when respondents are reminded about immigrants’ access to benefits. The survey experiment shows that information about newly arrived immigrants’ access to child benefit has only a small impact on support for increasing the child allowance. By contrast, information about labour migrants’ access to benefits for children living in another European Union country has a strong impact, and the observed sensitivity to this cue is not to the same extent confined to respondents who otherwise support welfare dualism.     

Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, however, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, but not in high income countries.     

Neonatal freshwater drowning after birth in the bathroom

The macroscopic and microscopic findings in neonatal freshwater drowning are demonstrated on the basis of 3 exemplary cases of birth in the bathroom after concealed pregnancy. If the newborn is expelled under water and remains there until death, the lungs cannot be ventilated with air. In case of incomplete or only temporary submersion, aeration of the lungs may develop in the immediate postpartum period. The morphologic criteria of separate existence are critically discussed with respect to the presented findings.     

Unilateral CDM—can developing countries finance generation of greenhouse gas emission credits on their own?

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was originally seen as an instrument with a bi- or multilateral character where an entity or fund from an industrialised country invests in a project in a developing country. The sluggish implementation of incentives for industrialised country companies to embark on CDM projects and low carbon prices led to a preference for just buying Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) instead of investing in projects. Thus a third option has gained prominence—the unilateral option where the project development is planned and financed within the developing country. We propose that a project should be called “pure unilateral” if it involves no foreign direct investment (FDI), only has the approval of the Designated National Authority (DNA) of the host country and sells its CERs after certification directly to an industrialised country. Unilateral projects can become attractive if the host country risk premium for foreign investors is high despite a high human, institutional and infrastructural capacity and domestic capital availability. Moreover, transaction costs can be reduced compared to foreign investments that have to overcome bureaucratic hurdles. On the other hand, technology transfer is likely to be lower, capacity building has to be undertaken by the host country and all risks have to be carried by host country entities. The potential to carry out unilateral CDM projects strongly varies among host countries. Whereas several countries from Asia and Latin America can design and implement projects autonomously, most of the Sub-Saharan countries rely on foreign support. International donors of capacity building grants should increasingly address those countries that are not presently focused on by foreign investors and support them in the design of local projects.

The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions

Using panel data for 104 countries between 1975 and 1998, this article tries to explain interruptions of IMF programmes around election dates in the recipient countries. On average, programmes seem to be more likely to break down before elections. This increase in interruption probabilities is, however, less severe in more democratic countries. In true democracies interruption frequencies are even lower prior to elections. While no other political variables than elections and democracy were found to influence compliance systematically, programme interruptions are significantly more likely in countries with high government consumption, high levels of short-term debt and low GDP per capita at programme initiation.     

Monetary policy in europe: towards a european central bank and one european currency

Most alternative blueprints for European Monetary Union (EMU) differ in their opinions about convergence requirements or the need for binding fiscal rules and controls of individual national governments' debt policies, but there is, if not complete consensus, widespread agreement that the European Central Bank (ECB) should be independent of political control from both European Community (EC) institutions and national governments. The main argument for an independent European central bank is empirical: those countries in which central banks are insulated from the political process and charged with maintaining price stability have experienced the lowest and most stable inflation rates in recent decades. The present paper reviews and critically evaluates this political economy literature which relates inflation performances to the constitutional features of central bank statutes. Based on this assessment the draft statutes of the ECB and the constitutions of the individual European national central banks are discussed in terms of the independence they grant central bank board members from partisan influences. Furthermore, concrete country-specific suggestions for enhancing central bank independence during stage two of the gradual transition to EMU, which is to be completed by 1999, are made. It is argued that in some countries laborious constitutional reforms of central bank statutes are overdue and must be implemented in order to make these institutions fit for an anti-inflationary EMU.     

The devil is in the shadow. Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity?

This paper assesses the relationship between institutions, output, and productivity when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. Our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy. However, once output is corrected for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker. The impact of institutions on total (“corrected”) factor productivity becomes insignificant. Differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor endowments. These results survive several tests for robustness.     

Implications of EU Enlargement on the EU Greenhouse Gas 'Bubble' and Internal Burden Sharing

Currently, the EU-15 forms the only 'bubble' under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008–2012. Of course due to Art. 4.4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the EU. This would reduce the gap between business-as-usual and the target by about 50%. If ratification is delayed to a point where it is clear which second wave countries will be members by 2008, the bubble should be extended by those countries. When in 2005 target negotiations start for the second commitment period, the EU should negotiate a bubble consisting of all states being certain to be members by 2013.